We study the economic benefits from using credit scoring models. We contribute to the literature by relating the discriminatory power of a credit scoring model to the optimal credit decision. Given the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, we derive (a) the profit-maximizing cutoff and (b) the pricing curve. Using these two concepts and a mixture thereof, we study a stylized loan market model with banks differing in the quality of their credit scoring model. Even for small quality differences, the variation in profitability among lenders is large and economically significant. We end our analysis by quantifying the impact on profits when information leaks from a competitor’s scoring model into the market.

Credit limit management is of paramount importance for successful short-term credit risk management, even more so when the situation in credit and financial markets is tense. We consider a continuous-time model where the credit provider and the credit taker interact within a game-theoretic framework under different information structures. The model with complete information provides decision-theoretic insights into the problem of optimal limit policies and motivates more complicated information structures. Moving to a partial information setup, incentive distortions emerge that are not in the bank’s interest. We discuss how these distortions can effectively be reduced by an incentive-compatible contract. Finally, we provide some practical implications of our theoretical results.