This paper studies the role of government-owned banks in the event of financial crises. The study takes an empirical perspective focusing on bank lending. We compare the lending responses across government-owned and private banks to financial crises using the balance sheet information of 764 major banks headquartered in 50 countries over the period of 1994–2009. Using a nested panel regression framework that allows for parameter shifts in the bank lending equation, we find robust evidence that government-owned banks increase their lending during crises relative to normal times, while private banks’ lending decreases. Government-owned banks thus counteract the lending slowdown of private banks. The findings suggest that governments can play an active counter-cyclical role in their banking systems directly through government-owned banks.

The present study investigates theoretically the lending responses of government-owned and private banks in the event of unexpected financial shocks. Our model predicts that public banks provide more loans to the real sector during times of crisis, compared to private banks which cut down on lending and increase liquidity holdings. We put forth three reasons for this heterogeneous behavior. First, the objective of public banks, in contrast to their private peers, is not only to maximize profits given risks, but also to stabilize and promote the recovery of the economy. Second, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals or avoid a bank run in a severe crisis, because the state has better access to additional funds making a recapitalization more likely. And finally, public banks may suffer less deposit withdrawals due to their higher credibility in promising a future recapitalization in the case of a severe crisis.

This paper examines empirically the determinants of bank interest margins in Central America and the Caribbean over the period 1998–2014. A particular focus is set on the impact of differences in the regulatory environment and market structure across countries in explaining the interest margins of individual banks. Our results suggest that bank market power, operating costs, credit risk, and liquid asset holdings increase the margin between loan and deposit rates, while increased income diversification and GDP growth are associated with lower loan-deposit spreads. When considering information on banking regulation, we find strong evidence to support our main hypothesis that improvements in market quality and liberalization have a significant effect on interest margins. More specifically, reductions in entry requirements to banking, higher involvement of foreign banks, and increased financial statement transparency are associated with significant reductions in interest margins.

This paper examines whether the rescue measures adopted during the global financial crisis helped to sustain the supply of bank lending. The analysis proposes a setup that allows testing for structural shifts in the bank lending equation, and employs a novel dataset covering large international banks headquartered in 14 major advanced economies for the period 1995–2010. While stronger capitalisation sustains loan growth in normal times, banks during a crisis can turn additional capital into greater lending only once their capitalisation exceeds a critical threshold. This suggests that recapitalisations may not translate into greater credit supply until bank balance sheets are sufficiently strengthened.

The paper studies the effectiveness of bank resolutions using a comprehensive database on banks headquartered in 18 European countries over the period 2000–19. By means of difference-in-differences methodology, we find that impaired asset segregations – otherwise known as bad banks – have been more effective than state-funded recapitalisations of distressed banks. While recapitalised banks seem to have used the injected funds mainly to clean up their balance sheets by reducing problem loans and cutting down on lending, banks that segregated assets increased progressively their lending after the creation of the bad bank. For both types of banking crisis interventions, we find a significant ex-post reduction in the cost of bank funding and shift towards deposit funding.

Drought can tighten agricultural credit conditions precisely when adaptation investments and access to working capital are most valuable. Using bank balance-sheet data merged with county-level U.S. Drought Monitor data for 2000–2020, we show that local credit markets exposed to drought experience significant declines in agricultural lending, with effects concentrated in severe episodes. These declines are strongest in markets served by geographically concentrated banks, especially single-county institutions, and weaker where lenders are more geographically diversified. In addition, we show that counties with greater irrigation intensity experience smaller lending declines during extreme droughts, while drought-related contractions are concentrated in counties with lower baseline crop resistance. Lending responses are also larger in counties with prior drought experience, consistent with persistent climate risk shaping local credit conditions. Our evidence highlights how climate risk, local adaptation, and bank structure jointly determine the availability of agricultural credit during drought episodes.