This study identifies conditions under which the audit risk model does, and does not, describe audit-planning (investment and pricing) decisions. In an experiment, audit partners and managers examined one of two cases where a material misstatement—error or irregularity—was discovered. The auditors assessed the elements of the audit risk model, assessed business risk and provided recommendations for the audit investment and fee. When the likelihood of an error was high, the audit risk model dominated business risk in the explanation of the audit investment, and the fee did not contain a risk premium. When the likelihood of an irregularity was high, business risk dominated the audit risk model in the explanation of the audit investment, and the fee contained a risk premium. These results suggest that the ability of the audit risk model to describe auditor behavior and the inclination of auditors to charge a risk premium depend upon the nature of the risks present in the audit. In the presence of errors, the audit risk model adequately described audit-planning decisions; in the presence of irregularities it did not.

This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how external audit planning is affected when internal auditors have incentives and the opportunity to bias their evaluations. Specifically, we draw on attribution theory to examine how internal auditor eligibility for incentive compensation and participation in consulting (i.e., two factors that provide incentives to bias audit evaluations) affect external audit planning. In addition, we examine the effects of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two routine internal audit tasks — an objective tests of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task — to evaluate whether their effects are contingent upon task subjectivity (i.e., opportunity to bias audit evaluations). Seventy-six external auditors from four Big 5 public accounting firms participated in an experiment that manipulated internal auditor compensation (fixed salary versus incentive compensation), the type of work that the internal auditors routinely perform (primarily auditing versus primarily consulting), and audit task subjectivity (objective tests of controls versus subjective inventory valuation). Our results suggest that the nature of internal auditors' compensation and work affect audit planning recommendations differently. The opportunity to receive incentive compensation results in less reliance on internal auditors' work and greater budgeted audit hours, but only for the subjective task. Although a consulting role decreases perceived internal auditor objectivity, it has a limited effect on planning recommendations. Specifically, consulting has no effect on reliance, and leads to greater budgeted audit hours only when incentive compensation is available. We discuss potential explanations for the results as well as implications for audit research, practice, and regulation.

This paper reports the results of an experiment that investigates how external audit planning is affected when internal auditors have incentives and the opportunity to bias their evaluations. Specifically, we draw on attribution theory to examine how internal auditor eligibility for incentive compensation and participation in consulting (i.e., two factors that provide incentives to bias audit evaluations) affect external audit planning. In addition, we examine the effects of incentive compensation and a consulting role across two routine internal audit tasks — an objective tests of controls task and a subjective inventory valuation task — to evaluate whether their effects are contingent upon task subjectivity (i.e., opportunity to bias audit evaluations). Seventy‐six external auditors from four Big 5 public accounting firms participated in an experiment that manipulated internal auditor compensation (fixed salary versus incentive compensation), the type of work that the internal auditors routinely perform (primarily auditing versus primarily consulting), and audit task subjectivity (objective tests of controls versus subjective inventory valuation). Our results suggest that the nature of internal auditors' compensation and work affect audit planning recommendations differently. The opportunity to receive incentive compensation results in less reliance on internal auditors' work and greater budgeted audit hours, but only for the subjective task. Although a consulting role decreases perceived internal auditor objectivity, it has a limited effect on planning recommendations. Specifically, consulting has no effect on reliance, and leads to greater budgeted audit hours only when incentive compensation is available. We discuss potential explanations for the results as well as implications for audit research, practice, and regulation.

Based on data collected from 616 experienced financial officers who use U.S. GAAP or IFRS and are domiciled in the U.S., Europe, or Asia, we examine how reporting standards (U.S. GAAP versus IFRS) and domicile (U.S. versus non-U.S.) affect earnings management (real versus accrual). U.S. firms using U.S. GAAP rely more heavily on real methods than non-U.S. firms that use either IFRS or U.S. GAAP and U.S. firms using IFRS. U.S. firms using U.S. GAAP operate in an environment that encourages real over accruals methods; specifically, U.S. GAAP facilitates detection of earnings management, and enforcement is more effective in the U.S. Further, the likelihood and amount of earnings management do not differ across conditions, suggesting that firms using less accruals earnings management tend to fully compensate by increasing real methods. So stronger reporting environments do not necessarily reduce total earnings management, but instead encourage substitution of real for accruals methods.

We provide evidence that analysts' stock-price judgments depend on (1) the method of accounting for a business combination and (2) the number of years that have elapsed since the business combination. Consistent with business-press reports of managers' concerns, analysts' stock-price judgments are lowest when a company applies the purchase method of accounting and ratably amortizes the acquisition premium. The number of years since the business combination affects analysts' price estimates only when the company applies the purchase method and ratably amortizes goodwill—analysts' price estimates are lower when the business-combination transaction is further in the past. However, this joint effect of accounting method and timing is mitigated by the Financial Accounting Standards Board's proposed income-statement format requiring companies to report separate line items for after-tax income before goodwill charges and net-of-tax goodwill charges. When a company uses the purchase method of accounting and writes off the acquisition premium as in-process research and development, analysts' stockprice judgments are not statistically different from their judgments when a company applies pooling-of-interest accounting.

Differentiating real earnings management (REM) from normal business decisions poses a unique challenge for auditors, researchers, and investors. The ambiguity associated with REM, and the fact that REM does not violate GAAP, may explain why its use is on the rise. While some assert that auditors are not, and should not be, concerned with REM, recent research suggests that REM may influence some auditor judgments. Using Correspondent Inference Theory (CIT) as our theoretical framework, we extend REM research by investigating the ways in which auditors respond to REM and how auditors deal with the intrinsic ambiguity associated with REM. We administer a 3×2 between‐subjects experiment to 113 highly‐experienced auditors, manipulating the level of ambiguity surrounding the observed REM (Explicit REM, Potential REM, or No REM) and the earnings context in which the client engages in REM (the client beat or missed the consensus earnings forecast). We find that auditors respond to REM by lowering assessments of management tone (i.e., management's commitment to a culture of high ethical standards), being more likely to discuss the issue with the audit committee, and being less likely to retain the client. Auditors respond to Explicit REM regardless of the earnings context, but respond to Potential (i.e., ambiguous) REM only when the client beats the forecast. Finally, we find that management tone mediates the relation between REM and auditor responses, even after controlling for various audit‐related risks. Thus, for auditors, REM appears to be primarily a “people” issue, as REM provides a negative signal about management.