We investigate the monitoring quality of accountants with ties to the Mafia in their role as auditors for “clean” firms—those with no known ties to organized crime. Using a proprietary government database, we identify Italian firms with alleged ties to the Mafia through their executives, directors, or shareholders. We define “suspect accountants” as those who serve as auditors for these Mafia‐connected firms, acknowledging their potential associations with criminal entities. We predict and find evidence that “clean” clients (treatment group) monitored by suspect accountants are more likely to engage in earnings management practices that reduce taxable income, compared with a control sample of “clean” firms monitored by accountants with no known Mafia ties (control group). Our findings suggest that accountants with ties to the Mafia act as low‐quality monitors in the “clean” economy.

We investigate how connections to organized crime manifest on firms' financial statements and analyze the impact of these connections on firm performance outcomes. Using a unique dataset that identifies Italian firms connected to organized crime, we find that connected firms have lower profitability, even though they report higher sales and lower labor cost. Connected firms also have higher bank debt, report lower cash holdings, experience quicker operating cycles and are more likely to file for bankruptcy. Further, we find that connected firms are more tax aggressive and engage in downward earnings manipulation. To corroborate our results, we exploit an amendment to the Italian Anti-Money Laundering regulation as a shock to the extent to which criminal organizations could expropriate connected firms' resources through money laundering. Our collective evidence suggests that connections to organized crime can drain a firm's resources, possibly through money-laundering schemes, and jeopardize its existence, thereby harming its shareholders. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text.