Studies examining managerial accounting decisions postulate that executives rewarded by earnings-based bonuses select accounting procedures that increase their compensation. The empirical results of these studies are conflicting. This paper analyzes the format of typical bonus contracts, providing a more complete characterization of their accounting incentive effects than earlier studies. The test results suggest that (1) accrual policies of managers are related to income-reporting incentives of their bonus contracts, and (2) changes in accounting procedures by managers are associated with adoption or modification of their bonus plan.

Abstract ABSTRACT: This paper examines whether stock Splits convey Information about earnings. The results Indicate that firms split their shares after a significant Increase in earnings. Before the stock split announcement, the market expects these earnings Increases to be temporary. The split announcement leads investors to increase their expectations that the past earnings increases are permanent. The evidence also suggests that the market's reaction to split announcements cannot be attributed to expectations of either future earnings increases or near-term cash dividend Increases.

[This paper examines whether stock splits convey information about earnings. The results indicate that firms split their shares after a significant increase in earnings. Before the stock split announcement, the market expects these earnings increases to be temporary. The split announcement leads investors to increase their expectations that the past earnings increases are permanent. The evidence also suggests that the market's reaction to split announcements cannot be attributed to expectations of either future earnings increases or near-term cash dividend increases.]

Research optimism among securities analysts has been attributed to incentives provided by underwriting activities. We examine how analysts’ forecast and recommendation optimism varies with the business activities used to fund research. We find that analysts at firms that funded research through underwriting and trading activities actually made less optimistic forecasts and recommendations than those at brokerage houses, who performed no underwriting. Optimism was particularly low for bulge underwriter firm analysts, implying that firm reputation reduces research optimism. There is also evidence that analysts at retail brokerage firms are more optimistic than those serving only institutional investors. We conclude that analyst optimism is at least partially driven by trading incentives.

Financial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means for management to communicate firm performance and governance to outside investors. We provide a framework for analyzing managers’ reporting and disclosure decisions in a capital markets setting, and identify key research questions. We then review current empirical research on disclosure regulation, information intermediaries, and the determinants and economic consequences of corporate disclosure. Our survey concludes that current research has generated a number of useful insights. We identify many fundamental questions that remain unanswered, and changes in the economic environment that raise new questions for research.

Accounting-based dividend constraints in lending contracts are imperfect means of mitigating conflicts of interests between stockholders and bondholders since managers have flexibility to make accounting decisions to circumvent the covenants. This paper documents firms' accounting and dividend responses to an increase in the tightness of dividend constraints. Firms cut dividends and do not appear to make accounting changes to circumvent the dividend restriction. The magnitude of the dividend cut is proportional to the tightness of the dividend constraint. This suggests that accounting-based covenants are effective means for bondholders to restrict firmsś dividend policies.

Reputation effects and other-regarding preferences have both been used to predict cooperative outcomes in markets with inefficient equilibria. Existing reputationbuilding models require either infinite time horizons or publicly observed identities, but cooperative outcomes have been observed in several moral hazard experiments with finite horizons and anonymous interactions. This paper introduces a full reputation equilibrium (FRE) with stereotyping (perceived type correlation) in which cooperation is predicted in early periods of a finitely repeated market with anonymous interactions. New experiments generate results in line with the FRE prediction, including final-period reversions to stage-game equilibrium and noncooperative play under unfavorable payoff parameters. (JEL C72, C73, C78, J41)

Equity offers, Primary stock offers, Asset beta, Equity beta

We examine operating performance and ownership of joint venture and wholly-owned merchant banks operating in Singapore from the formation of the industry to its maturity. For our sample, joint ventures dominated wholly-owned banks as an organizational form only within the first six years of the industry's life, when there were opportunities for organizational learning and risk sharing by venture partners. Thereafter, new banks were typically wholly-owned subsidiaries and 71% of surviving joint ventures switched to wholly-owned status. Despite their higher mortality rates, we find no evidence of lower performance for joint ventures.

We examine investor communication issues using the experience of CUC International. CUC had difficulty convincing investors that its marketing outlays were profitable investments, leading to stock misvaluation over an extended period. To resolve this problem, CUC adopted an accounting change and then underwent a leveraged recapitalization. Subsequently, it accelerated recap debt repayments and initiated a stock repurchase. CUC's experience suggests that accounting reports are not always effective in investor communication. While financial signals are more effective, their impact is not as immediate as predicted by prior research. The CUC case suggests that investor communications is a rich area for future research.