[This paper investigates an operational inconsistency between the constrained priority rationing scheme introduced by Manove in 1973 and the criterion used to determine an "optimal" priority matrix. A truncation of the optimality criterion is suggested in order to resolve this inconsistency and also reduce a potential source of bias against final demand.]

We survey the empirical literature analysing the process of enterprise restructuring in transition economies. The survey provides new insights into the relative effectiveness of different reform policies, and into how this effectiveness varies across regions. We study the effects of privatization, the importance of different types of owners, the effects of foreign and domestic competition, the consequences of soft budgets, and the role of managerial incentives and managerial human capital, on enterprise restructuring.

We survey the empirical literature analyzing the process of enterprise restructuring in transition economies. The survey provides new insights into the relative effectiveness of different reform policies, and into how this effectiveness varies across regions. We study the effects of privatization, the importance of different types of owners, the effects of foreign and domestic competition, the consequences of soft budgets, and the role of managerial incentives and managerial human capital, with regard to enterprise restructuring.

This paper reviews the NBER's "The Transition in Eastern Europe." This book's 18 essays examine privatization, stabilization, fiscal policies, the nascent private sector, bankruptcy, foreign trade, and investment, etc. Individual country performance occupies six studies. These essays, which are of high quality, provide a cross-section of the literature on transition. However, the book's stronger conclusions are not supported by strong evidence. Two conclusions, unemphasized by contributors, emerge. Expectations, which reflect the theories used to design standard reforms, are often unfulfilled during reforms. A plausible explanation for the misplaced expectations is the ahistorical approach of those theories.

Corruption estimates rely largely on self-reports of affected individuals and officials. Yet survey respondents are often reticent to tell the truth about sensitive subjects, leading to downward biases in surveybased corruption estimates. This paper develops a method to estimate the prevalence of reticent behavior and reticence-adjusted rates of corruption using survey responses to sensitive questions. A statistical model captures how respondents answer a combination of conventional and randomresponse questions, allowing identification of the effect of reticence. GMM and maximum likelihood estimates are obtained for ten countries. Adjusting for reticence dramatically alters the perceptions of the extent of corruption.