We survey and interview more than 400 executives to determine the factors that drive reported earnings and disclosure decisions. We find that managers would rather take economic actions that could have negative long-term consequences than make within-GAAP accounting choices to manage earnings. A surprising 78% of our sample admits to sacrificing long-term value to smooth earnings. Managers also work to maintain predictability in earnings and financial disclosures. We also find that managers make voluntary disclosures to reduce information risk and boost stock price but at the same time, try to avoid setting disclosure precedents that will be difficult to maintain.

We provide evidence that identifiable subsets of investors use significantly different information sets. Investors initiating large trades respond to analysts’ earnings forecast errors, while investors initiating small trades respond to a less-sophisticated signal that underestimates the implications of current earnings innovations for future earnings levels. This suggests small investors exhibit the behavior that Bernard and Thomas [Journal of Accounting and Economics 13, 305–340] theorize causes post-earnings announcement drift. We also use analysts’ forecasts to significantly improve the predictability of returns around earnings announcements previously documented by Bernard and Thomas. Finally, results attempting to link return predictability to the prevalence of small-investor trading are mixed.

The objective of this research is to articulate a decision‐making foundation for the systems audit approach. Under this audit approach, the auditor first gains an understanding of the auditee's economic environment, strategy, and business processes and then forms expectations about its performance and financial reporting. Proponents of this audit approach argue that decision making is enhanced because the knowledge of the system allows the auditor to focus on the most important risks. However, there has not been an explicit framework to explain how systems knowledge can enhance decision making. To provide such a framework, we combine mental model theory with general systems theory to produce a hypothesis we refer to as a systems‐mediated mental model hypothesis. We test this hypothesis using experimental economics methods. We find that (1) subjects make systematic errors under the setting without an organizing framework provided by the systems information, and (2) the presence of an organizing framework results in lower reporting errors. Importantly, the organizing framework significantly enhances decision making in the settings where the environment changed. Establishing a decision‐making foundation for systems audits can provide an important building block that, in part, can contribute to the development of a more effective and efficient audit technology ‐ an important objective now when audits are facing a credibility crisis.

We investigate the linkage between changes in firm value and changes in capital allocation efficiency resulting from dismantling internal capital markets via spinoffs. We find no evidence of wholesale misallocation of capital pre-spinoff. On the average, excess value increases following spinoffs. Furthermore, changes in excess value are positively linked to changes in capital allocational efficiency following spinoff. We find that spinoff announcement returns are greater (smaller) when the parent allocates capital to the unit to be spun off in a seemingly less (more) efficient manner. Divested division capital expenditures move toward industry levels after spinoff, regardless of their relative investment opportunities.

It is common practice to use sensible rules of thumb for cleaning data. Measurement error is often the justification for removing (trimming) or recoding (winsorizing) observations where the dependent variable has values that lie outside a specified range. We consider a general measurement error process that nests many plausible models. Analytic results demonstrate that winsorizing and trimming are solutions for a narrow class of error processes. Indeed such procedures can induce or exacerbate bias. Monte Carlo simulations and empirical results demonstrate the fragility of cleaning. Even on root mean square error criteria, we cannot find generalizable justifications for these procedures.

This study develops a model in which rational issuers maximize the expected surplus from going public by choosing an offer price that weighs the benefit of higher proceeds if the offer is completed against the cost of foregone surplus if the offer fails. Increases in the market valuation of comparable firms during the waiting period imply higher surplus associated with going public; issuers respond with a partial revision in the offer price to elevate the probability of completion. The model offers insights into many facts associated with initial public offering pricing, including partial adjustment to market returns, the inverse relation between withdrawal and market returns, the asymmetric price adjustment to up versus down market returns, hot-issue markets, and unconditional underpricing.

The nonlinear relationship between corporate value and managerial ownership is well documented. This has been attributed to the onset of managerial entrenchment, which results in a decrease of corporate value for increasing levels of managerial holdings. We propose a new structure for this relationship that accounts for the effect of conflicting managerial incentives, and external and internal disciplinary monitoring mechanisms. Using this specification as the basis for our analysis, we provide evidence that the managerial ownership–corporate value relationship is co-deterministic. This finding is at odds with recent work which reports that corporate value determines managerial ownership but not vice-versa.

We derive the quantitative implications of growth theory for U.S. corporate equity plus net debt over the period 1960–2001. There were large secular movements in corporate equity values relative to GDP, with dramatic declines in the 1970's and dramatic increases starting in the 1980's and continuing throughout the 1990's. During the same period, there was little change in the capital—output ratio or earnings share of output. We ask specifically whether the theory accounts for these observations. We find that it does, with the critical factor being changes in the U.S. tax and regulatory system. We find that the theory also accounts for the even larger movements in U.K. equity values relative to GDP in this period.