We use bootstrap simulations to examine the properties of long-horizon U.S. stock market returns. We document the rate at which continuously compounded market returns converge toward normal distributions as we extend the horizon from 1 month to 30 years, and the rate at which dollar payoffs converge toward lognormal. We also verify that, though largely irrelevant at short horizons, uncertainty about the expected market return has a substantial impact on uncertainty about long-horizon payoffs.

Does an increase in competition increase or decrease bank stability? I use a novel way to capture changes in banking competition by exploring how the exogenous state-specific process of banking deregulation gradually lowered entry barriers into urban banking markets. I find that the increase in market contestability significantly improves bank stability. This result is robust to the inclusion of additional fixed effects and other influences, such as mergers and acquisitions, or geographic expansion. Moreover, I find that greater competition reduces banks’ failure probability, share of non-performing loans and increases profitability. These findings suggest that competition increases stability, as it improves bank profitability and asset quality.

We distinguish between identification and establishing causality. Identification means forming a unique mapping from features of data to quantities that are of interest to economists. Establishing causality by finding sources of exogenous variation is often considered synonymous with identification, but these two concepts are distinct. Exogenous variation is only sometimes necessary and never sufficient to identify economically interesting parameters. Instead, even for causal questions, identification must rest on an underlying economic model. We illustrate these points by analyzing identification in three recent papers and by examining the estimation of a simple dynamic model. Received June 6, 2017; editorial decision September 26, 2017 by Editor Gregor Matvos. Authors have furnished supplementary code, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We examine the robustness of empirical models and findings concerning CEO turnover. We show that the sensitivity of turnover to abnormal firm performance is an extremely robust result. In contrast, evidence indicating a relation between turnover and industry performance is both weak and fragile. We show that small changes in turnover modeling choices can affect inferences in a large way. Our evidence casts substantial doubt on the hypothesis that there is a large industry performance component to turnover decisions. We use our findings to offer some general prescriptions for checking robustness results in CEO turnover research. Received June 6, 2017; editorial decision July 10, 2017 by Editor Uday Rajan.

This study reports estimates of the marginal benefits and costs of increasing the regulatory minimum bank equity-to-asset “leverage ratio” from 4 to 15 percent. Benefits arise from reducing the probability of a banking crisis. Costs arise from reduced lending, should banks pass off higher equity costs onto borrowers. Net benefits increase with a higher discount rate, a smaller tax advantage of debt, a lower non-financial corporate debt-to-capital ratio, a higher cost of crises, a longer duration of crises or if crises have some permanent effects. Baseline estimates indicate that the benefits equal costs at 19 percent.

A growing experimental literature studies the determinants of cooperation in infinitely repeated games, tests different predictions of the theory, and suggests an empirical solution to the problem of multiple equilibria. To provide a robust description of the literature's findings, we gather and analyze a metadata set of experiments on infinitely repeated prisoner's dilemma games. The experimental data show that cooperation is affected by infinite repetition and is more likely to arise when it can be supported in equilibrium. However, the fact that cooperation can be supported in equilibrium does not imply that most subjects will cooperate. High cooperation rates will emerge only when the parameters of the repeated game are such that cooperation is very robust to strategic uncertainty. We also review the results regarding the effect of imperfect monitoring, changing partners, and personal characteristics on cooperation and the strategies used to support it.

Our goal is to develop insights about the maximum squared Sharpe ratio for model factors as a metric for ranking asset pricing models. We consider nested and non-nested models. The nested models are the capital asset pricing model, the three-factor model of Fama and French (1993), the five-factor extension in Fama and French (2015), and a six-factor model that adds a momentum factor. The non-nested models examine three issues about factor choice in the six-factor model: (1) cash profitability versus operating profitability as the variable used to construct profitability factors, (2) long-short spread factors versus excess return factors, and (3) factors that use small or big stocks versus factors that use both.

We use our survey of finance professors from universities across the USA to investigate whether men and women react differently to prior gains and losses. We find that after incurring a loss, a large fraction of men continue to invest in stocks, but a majority of women tend to avoid investing in stocks. Even though prior losses increase the expectation of unfavorable market conditions, we find that women are more likely than men to expect unfavorable market conditions irrespective of whether they have made a gain or a loss in their prior stock market investments.