Three alternative, but not mutually exclusive, perspectives on accounting method choice are contrasted: the opportunistic behavior, efficient contracting, and information perspectives. Much of the empirical work on accounting method choice is based on the opportunistic behavior perspective. The Malmquist and Main and Smith papers are attempts to view accounting method choice as a means of improving the monitoring capabilities of contracts which rely on accounting numbers. The papers serve as useful vehicles for illustrating the difficulties of delineating a set of maintained assumptions that result in hypotheses about how accounting method choice affects the monitoring characteristics of contracts, and distinguishing between hypotheses based on the three perspectives on accounting method choice.

This paper presents a partially revealing rational expectations model of competitive trading to identify two effects of information releases; an informedness effect and a consensus effect. The informedness effect measures the extent to which agents become more knowledgeable, and the consensus effect measures the extent of agreement among agents at the time of an information release. We demonstrate that informedness and consensus generally occur jointly when information is disseminated, and that unexpected price changes and trading volume are each influenced by both informedness and consensus. Thus, interpretations of unexpected price changes and volume associated with information releases are conceptually similar. Since informedness and consensus each affect both the variance of price changes and volume, our paper provides an economic rationale for examining both price and volume effects at the time of information releases.

[This paper presents a partially revealing rational expectations model of competitive trading to identify two effects of information releases; an informedness effect and a consensus effect. The informedness effect measures the extent to which agents become more knowledgeable, and the consensus effect measures the extent of agreement among agents at the time of an information release. We demonstrate that informedness and consensus generally occur jointly when information is disseminated, and that unexpected price changes and trading volume are each influenced by both informedness and consensus. Thus, interpretations of unexpected price changes and volume associated with information releases are conceptually similar. Since informedness and consensus each affect both the variance of price changes and volume, our paper provides an economic rationale for examining both price and volume effects at the time of information releases.]