This paper begins by comparing the available well‐developed micro‐economic models in finance which recognize uncertainty. It is argued that models whose distinctive simplifying assumption restricts utility functions are superior to those which instead restrict probability distributions, both with respect to the realism of their assumptions and richness of their conclusions. In particular, the most successful model, based on generalized logarithmic utility (GLUM), is a multiperiod consumption/portfolio and equilibrium model in discrete‐time which (1) requires decreasing absolute risk aversion; (2) tolerates increasing, constant, or decreasing proportional risk aversion; (3) assumes no exogenous specification of the contemporaneous or intertemporal stochastic process of security prices; (4) tolerates heterogeneity with respect to wealth, lifetime, time‐and risk‐preference and beliefs; (5) results in a complete specification of consumption/portfolio decision and sharing rules which include nontrivial multiperiod separation properties and explains demand for default‐free bonds of various maturities and options; (6) leads to a solution to the aggregation problem; (7) results in a complete specification of the contemporaneous and intertemporal process of security prices which reveals necessary and sufficient conditions for an unbiased term structure and the market portfolio to follow a random walk as a natural outcome of equilibrium; (8) provides an empirically testable aggregate consumption function relating per capita consumption to per capita wealth and the present value of a perpetual default‐free annuity which does not require inferences of ex ante beliefs from ex post data; (9) provides a nontrivial multiperiod extension of popular single‐period security valuation models which is empirically testable; (10) yields a simple multiperiod valuation formula for an uncertain income stream even when this income is serially correlated over time.

We provide the first empirical study of the relationship between corporate working capital management and shareholders’ wealth. Examining US corporations from 1990 through 2006, we find evidence that: the incremental dollar invested in net operating working capital is worth less than the incremental dollar held in cash for the average firm; the valuation of the incremental dollar invested in net operating working capital is significantly influenced by a firm’s future sales expectations, its debt load, its financial constraints, and its bankruptcy risk; and the value of the incremental dollar extended in credit to one’s customers has a greater effect on shareholders’ wealth than the incremental dollar invested in inventories for the average firm.

This paper explores the traditional and prevalent approach to credit risk assessment – the rating system. We first describe the rating systems of the two main credit rating agencies, Standard & Poor's and Moody's. Then we show how an internal rating system in a bank can be organized in order to rate creditors systematically. We suggest adopting a two-tier rating system. First, an obligor rating that can be easily mapped to a default probability bucket. Second, a facility rating that determines the loss parameters in case of default, such as (i) “loss given default” (LGD), which depends on the seniority of the facility and the quality of the gurantees, and (ii) “usage given default” (UGD) for loan commitments, which depends on the nature of the commitment and the rating history of the borrower.

The new BIS 1998 capital requirements for market risks allows banks to use internal models to assess regulatory capital related to both general market risk and credit risk for their trading book. This paper reviews the current proposed industry sponsored Credit Value-at-Risk methodologies. First, the credit migration approach, as proposed by JP Morgan with CreditMetrics, is based on the probability of moving from one credit quality to another, including default, within a given time horizon. Second, the option pricing, or structural approach, as initiated by KMV and which is based on the asset value model originally proposed by Merton (Merton, R., 1974. Journal of Finance 28, 449–470). In this model the default process is endogenous, and relates to the capital structure of the firm. Default occurs when the value of the firm’s assets falls below some critical level. Third, the actuarial approach as proposed by Credit Suisse Financial Products (CSFP) with CreditRisk+ and which only focuses on default. Default for individual bonds or loans is assumed to follow an exogenous Poisson process. Finally, McKinsey proposes CreditPortfolioView which is a discrete time multi-period model where default probabilities are conditional on the macro-variables like unemployment, the level of interest rates, the growth rate in the economy, … which to a large extent drive the credit cycle in the economy.

[Prior research indicates that auditors encounter difficulty in applying experienced error frequencies to judgments of the probability that an audit objective is violated given a particular transaction cycle. This difficulty may occur because of a mismatch between the organization of this particular judgment task and the organization of auditors' knowledge. We test the effectiveness of two decision aids at counteracting this difficulty: (1) a checklist aid which facilitates knowledge retrieval and (2) a decomposition-and-mechanical-aggregation aid which facilitates both knowledge retrieval and aggregation. The checklist aid slightly improved the degree to which auditors' judgments reflected experienced frequencies and the mechanical-aggregation aid greatly improved auditors' judgments, completely counteracting the effect of the task organization-knowledge organization mismatch.]

We examine whether information in footnotes might lack reliability because auditors permit more misstatement in disclosed, as opposed to recognized, amounts. In both the stock-compensation and lease settings, audit partners require greater correction of misstatements in recognized amounts than in the equivalent disclosed amounts. Debriefing questions indicate that the partners make these decisions knowingly, even though they expect greater client resistance to correcting recognized amounts, because they view recognized amounts as more material. Partners also spend more time on correction decisions for recognized information. While prior literature suggests that amounts are often relegated to footnotes because they are less reliable, our results suggest that the actual choice to disclose versus recognize can also reduce information reliability. These results have implications for the interpretation of prior research on the reliability of recognized and disclosed numbers, for financial-accounting standard setters who may want to consider the reliability effects of their recognition versus disclosure decisions, and for auditing standard setters who may wish to clarify auditors' responsibilities for preventing misstatements in disclosed amounts.

Investments that are classified as Level 2 within the fair value hierarchy account for approximately 92 percent of US banks' fair value assets. We report an experiment that examines how experienced auditors apply current PCAOB guidance when auditing portfolios of these assets. We hypothesize and find that, depending on how overstatement is distributed within a portfolio, current PCAOB guidance leads auditors to make adjustments that are predictably larger or smaller than the aggregate overstatement in the portfolio. Auditors are more likely to follow PCAOB guidance when doing so leads to lower audit adjustments and higher client income. We also predict and find that auditors identify some patterns of overstatement as indicative of management bias, but not others. However, management-bias assessments do not affect auditors' adjustment decisions as standards imply they should, even when auditors are prompted to consider management bias. Together, these results highlight a potential deficiency in current auditing guidance that managers could exploit by strategically locating overstatements within securities with larger book values or by spreading those overstatements across many securities within a portfolio. We suggest changes to current PCAOB guidance which may reduce these effects.

ABSTRACT In the published proceedings of the first Journal of Accounting Research Conference, Vatter [1966] lamented that “Gathering direct and original facts is a tedious and difficult task, and it is not surprising that such work is avoided.” For the fiftieth JAR Conference, we introduce a framework to help researchers understand the complementary value of seven empirical methods that gather data in different ways: prestructured archives, unstructured (“hand‐collected”) archives, field studies, field experiments, surveys, laboratory studies, and laboratory experiments. The framework spells out five goals of an empirical literature and defines the seven methods according to researchers’ choices with respect to five data gathering tasks. We use the framework and examples of successful research studies in the financial reporting literature to clarify how data gathering choices affect a study's ability to achieve its goals, and conclude by showing how the complementary nature of different methods allows researchers to build a literature more effectively than they could with less diverse approaches to gathering data.

In response to recommendations by the AICPA Special Committee on Financial Reporting and the Association for Investment Management and Research, the FASB recently invited comment regarding the question, “Given [efficient] markets, would any disservice be done to the interests of individual investors by allowing professional investors access to more extensive information?” [AICPA (1996) Report of the Special Committee on Financial Reporting and the Association for Investment Management and Research, New York, p. 22]. Research in psychology [e.g. Griffin & Tversky (1992) The weighing of evidence and the determinants of confidence. Cognitive Psychology, 411–435] suggests that less-informed investors may suffer from over-confidence and trade too aggressively given their information. This paper reports on an experiment designed to address these issues. In the experiment, security values are determined by the price/book ratios of actual firms, “more-informed” investors observe three value-relevant financial ratios derived from Value-Line reports, and “less-informed” investors observe only one of those signals. Even after market prices have stabilized after many rounds of trading, less-informed investors systematically transfer wealth to more-informed investors as a result of biased prices and overly aggressive trading. However, alerting less-informed investors to the extent of their informational disadvantage eliminates these welfare losses. The results thus suggest that providing information to only professional investors could harm the welfare of less-informed investors if less-informed investors are not aware of the extent of their informational disadvantage.