Whereas corporate political connections are known to enhance equity values, we demonstrate that union political activity can have the opposite effect. We examine the consequences of a recent Australian state law that restricts union political activity but does not change collective bargaining rights. In the wake of this law, the equity values of affected unionized firms significantly increase, and consistent with this market reaction, these firms are able to bargain for more favorable labor contracts than their unionized peers in other states. The evidence strongly suggests that unions use political activism to extract rents from shareholders and benefit their members.

We show that an executive is optimistic about her company׳s prospects if and only if she retains some of the shares received whenever she exercises company stock options. Empirically, an indicator of optimism based on this idea matches the expected relations between optimism and corporate decision-making better than commonly used indicators based on the timing of option exercise. This makes sense, as our model of an executive׳s optimal option exercise and portfolio choice demonstrates that the timing of option exercise depends just as much on stock and other executive characteristics as it does on optimism.

Theoretical models of groups suggest that sub-group usage can affect communication among members and group decision-making. To examine the trade-offs from forming sub-groups, we assemble a detailed dataset on corporate boards (groups) and committees (sub-groups). Boards have increasingly used committees formally staffed entirely by outside directors. Our data show that twenty-five percent of all director meetings occurred in such committees in 1996; this increased to 45% by 2010. Our evidence suggests that granting formal authority to such committees can impair communication and decision-making. Sub-groups are relatively understudied, but our results suggest that they play an important role in group functioning and corporate governance.