This paper expands the empirical research on the auctions of failed financial institutions by examining the thrift industry Accelerated Resolution Program as an alternative to the standard auction procedures. Jointly managed by the Office of Thrift Supervision and the Resolution Trust Corporation, the objective of this program was to intervene before insolvency and, thereby, to reduce the regulatory expenditures. Previous research has often found the existence of a wealth transfer to the winning bidders in both commercial bank and thrift auctions. In contrast to this previous research, no evidence is found in this study to conclude that a wealth transfer occurred in standard Resolution Trust Corporation auctions. Furthermore, while the Accelerated Resolution Program yielded positive abnormal returns, there is also no evidence of a wealth transfer.

Corporate governance and managerial behavior, both in terms of entrenchment and financial leverage, have been individually shown to directly affect firm performance and to indirectly affect it through influence on other determinants of performance. Employing an empirical model that captures documented interactions among the explanatory variables, we examine the importance of these integrated factors in an investment decision by focusing on the determinants of bank bidding activity for failed thrift institutions. While the endogenous relationships based on previous research appear tractable, their overall addition to the explanatory power of the bidding model based on traditional auction variables is very limited. These results suggest questions that should be further examined regarding how much managerial variables as defined by previous studies actually affect firm investment decisions once their endogeneity and unique linkages are formally recognized.

Of the many conglomerate studies to date, some have dealt with the risk-return performance of conglomerates in the context of the capital asset pricing model [2, 7, 10, 14], others have considered the motives for the formation of conglomerates [4, 5, 6, 13], and still others have examined the operating characteristics of conglomerates [9, 12, 15]. Within the last group, Weston and Mansinghka [15, p. 928] argued that the primary motivation for conglomerate formation is defensive diversification, “…defined as diversification to avoid adverse effects on profitability from developments taking place in the firm's traditional product market areas.” Another motivation is provided by Levy and Sarnat [4] and Lewellen [5] who demonstrated that the only economic gain from a purely conglomerate merger may be the increased debt capacity resulting from the combination of entities having imperfectly correlated earnings streams.

Glenn W. Boyle, Richard B. Carter, Roger D. Stover, Extraordinary Antitakeover Provisions and Insider Ownership Structure: The Case of Converting Savings and Loans, The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Jun., 1998), pp. 291-304

[In this paper, we investigate the disciplining role of banks and bank debt in the market for corporate control. We find that relationship bank lending intensity and bank client network have positive effects on the probability of a borrowing firm becoming a target. This effect is enhanced in cases where the target and acquirer have a relationship with the same bank. Moreover, we utilize an experiment to show that the effects of relationship bank lending intensity on takeover probability are not driven by endogeneity. Finally, we also investigate reasons motivating a bank's informational role in the market for corporate control.]

In this paper, we investigate the disciplining role of banks and bank debt in the market for corporate control. We find that relationship bank lending intensity and bank client network have positive effects on the probability of a borrowing firm becoming a target. This effect is enhanced in cases where the target and acquirer have a relationship with the same bank. Moreover, we utilize an experiment to show that the effects of relationship bank lending intensity on takeover probability are not driven by endogeneity. Finally, we also investigate reasons motivating a bank's informational role in the market for corporate control.

We investigate the effectiveness of initiating deposit insurance at the outset of a banking crisis. Using a conjoint analysis approach that allows us to consider the simultaneous impact of multiple deposit insurance attributes and various counterfactuals, we ask a multinational sample of respondents how they would view hypothetical account profiles following the failure of a large competing bank. Previous experience matters: respondents from countries without explicit deposit insurance exhibit greater withdrawal risk, suggesting that the introduction of deposit insurance during a crisis may be only partially successful in preventing bank runs. They also impose a higher deposit interest rate premium. Having a long-term bank relationship reduces withdrawal risk, as does the absence of co-insurance.

By placing a ceiling on the amount of possible depositor loss, deposit insurance should result in a lower deposit risk premium. However, this effect may be modified if either the insurance promise has low credibility or the moral hazard incentives generated by deposit insurance result in a greater probability of bank default. Using financial and institutional panel data from thirteen countries, we find that the risk premium is over 40 basis points higher on average in uninsured countries than in countries that offer insurance up to some pre-specified maximum. However, the risk premium has a non-linear relationship with the level of maximum insurance coverage, suggesting that the market recognizes the moral hazard potential. Moreover, the effect of deposit insurance on the risk premium is weaker in countries with strong creditor rights, consistent with the view that investors view the latter as a substitute for explicit deposit insurance.