What are the causes and consequences of commonality in liquidity? We examine this issue using a model of liquidity trading in which liquidity shocks are decomposed into common (systematic) and idiosyncratic components. We show that common liquidity shocks do not give rise to commonality in trading volume. Indeed, trading volume is independent of systematic liquidity risk, and this risk is always priced irrespective of market liquidity. In contrast, idiosyncratic liquidity shocks create liquidity demand and volume, and investors can diversify their risk by trading. Hence, pricing of the risk of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks depends on market liquidity, with idiosyncratic liquidity risk being fully priced only in perfectly illiquid markets. While trading volume increases with the variance of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, price volatility increases with the variance of both idiosyncratic and systematic liquidity shocks. Surprisingly, our results are largely independent of the number of different securities traded in the market. When asset returns are uncorrelated, there is no transmission of liquidity across assets even when investors experience common liquidity shocks, suggesting that such liquidity shocks may not be the source of commonality in liquidity across assets detected in the literature. However, under limited conditions, more liquid securities can act as substitutes for less liquid securities. Overall, our findings suggest that common factors in liquidity may be the outcome of covariation in investor heterogeneity (e.g., as measured by co-movements in the volatility of idiosyncratic liquidity shocks) rather than of common liquidity shocks. Moreover, we find that different liquidity proxies measure different things, which has implications for future empirical analysis.

Abstract This paper studies the conditions under which accounting‐based debt covenants increase firm value in a setting that incorporates the conflicting incentives of shareholders, bondholders, and managers. We construct a model in which debt is needed to discipline managerial investment decisions despite endogenous compensation contracts. We show that accounting covenants increase value when (1) debt serves as a credible commitment to penalize poor investment decisions; (2) the firm faces other (exogenous) sources of uncertainty that can make debt risky despite good investment decisions; and (3) accounting information serves as a contractible proxy for firm's economic performance. In these circumstances, accounting covenants ensure that shareholders do not offer compensation schemes that would encourage bondholder wealth expropriation when the debt becomes risky. A covenant specifying a required level of accounting performance provides additional bondholder power when performance is low. An accounting‐based dividend covenant allows a disbursement to maintain investment incentives when performance is high without allowing dividend‐based expropriation. The optimal covenants depend on the reliability of accounting information, and the interaction between accounting performance and the different incentive conflicts provides new insight into the empirical literature on accounting‐based covenants.

Using a comprehensive database of headlines about individual companies, I examine monthly returns following public news. I compare them to stocks with similar returns, but no identifiable public news. There is a difference between the two sets. I find strong drift after bad news. Investors seem to react slowly to this information. I also find reversal after extreme price movements unaccompanied by public news. The separate patterns appear even after adjustments for risk exposure and other effects. They are, however, mainly seen in smaller, more illiquid stocks. These findings support some integrated theories of investor over- and underreaction.

The paper provides evidence on the effects of including a target termination fee in a merger contract. I test the implications of the hypothesis that termination fees are used by self-interested target managers to deter competing bids and protect “sweetheart” deals with white knight bidders, presumably resulting in lower premiums for target shareholders. An alternative hypothesis is that target managers use termination fees to encourage bidder participation by ensuring that the bidder is compensated for the revelation of valuable private information released during merger negotiations. My empirical evidence demonstrates that merger deals with target termination fees involve significantly higher premiums and success rates than deals without such clauses. Furthermore, only weak support is found for the contention that termination fees deter competing bids. Overall, the evidence suggests that termination fee use is at least not harmful, and is likely beneficial, to target shareholders.

Using a new Bayesian method for the analysis of diffusion processes, this article finds that the nonlinear drift in interest rates found in a number of previous studies can be confirmed only under prior distributions that are best described as informative. The assumption of stationarity, which is common in the literature, represents a nontrivial prior belief about the shape of the drift function. This belief and the use of "flat" priors contribute strongly to the finding of nonlinear mean reversion. Implementation of an approximate Jeffreys prior results in virtually no evidence for mean reversion in interest rates unless stationarity is assumed. Finally, the article documents that nonlinear drift is primarily a feature of daily rather than monthly data, and that these data contain a transitory element that is not reflected in the volatility of longer-maturity yields.

Many claim that GAAP financial information has become largely irrelevant to explaining valuations. Core et al. compare financial information's value relevance for the New Economy stocks with other stocks. We supplement their analysis with new evidence on the economic determinants of the time-series variation in the coefficients mapping financial information into prices. We document significant variation in the coefficients related to proxies for changing market growth expectations and discount rates and additional variation consistent with time-varying correlated omitted variables. Such findings make it difficult to draw unambiguous inferences about the relevance and reliability of financial information from value-relevance regressions.

For 234 large non-financial corporations using derivatives, we report the magnitude of their risk exposure hedged by financial derivatives. If interest rates, currency exchange rates, and commodity prices change simultaneously by three standard deviations, the median firm's derivatives portfolio, at most, generates 15 million in cash and 31 million in value. These amounts are modest relative to firm size, and operating and investing cash flows, and other benchmarks. Corporate derivatives use appears to be a small piece of non-financial firms’ overall risk profile. This suggests a need to rethink past empirical research documenting the importance of firms’ derivative use.