ABSTRACT Evidence evaluation in accounting often involves both the assessment of evidence relevance and the combination of its relevance and source to assess overall strength. We decompose this strength-assessment judgment into its components—relevance assessment and source and relevance combination—and consider the effects of experience. Participants in our experiment assess the strength and relevance of tax authorities in relation to a client scenario. Contrary to prior research, we find that more-experienced participants exhibit greater use of analogical reasoning when evaluating tax-authority relevance than do less-experienced participants. We find a similar experience effect in the use of configural information processing to combine authority source and relevance, a judgment not previously considered in tax. The effects of experience are particularly important in the current environment as the tax function is a leading cause of material weaknesses and restatements under Sarbanes-Oxley and tax executives cite increasing difficulty in hiring and retaining qualified professionals. Data Availability: Data are available from the authors on request.

We investigate the role of book-tax conformity in firms' financial reporting activities using a unique set of publicly traded firms that were forced to switch for tax purposes from the cash method to the accrual method. Prior to the mandated change, little trade-off existed between tax planning and financial reporting goals for these firms. After the change, recognition criteria for tax and financial reporting purposes became more alike, increasing the trade-off between financial reporting and tax objectives. Our results suggest that required use of the accrual method for tax purposes causes firms to defer income for financial statement purposes.

ABSTRACT We investigate whether politically sensitive contractors pay higher taxes and whether their bargaining power reduces these tax costs. Using federal contractor data, we develop a new composite measure of political sensitivity that captures both the political visibility arising from federal contracts and the importance of federal contracts to the firm. We proxy for bargaining power using the firm-level proportion of contract revenues not subject to competition, the firm-level proportion of contract revenues arising from defense contracts, and industry-level concentration ratios. We find that politically sensitive firms pay higher federal taxes, all else equal. However, firms with greater bargaining power incur fewer tax-related political costs. Our study provides new evidence on the political cost hypothesis in a tax setting and the first evidence of the interactive effects of a firm's political sensitivity and bargaining power on tax-related political costs. JEL Classifications: M41; H26