[We study the role of firm-and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time-invariant firm and, especially, manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many settings, it is important to include fixed effects to mitigate potential omitted variable bias. Furthermore, we find that compensation fixed effects are significantly correlated with management styles (i.e., manager fixed effects in corporate policies). Finally, the method used in the article has a number of potential applications in financial economics.]

This paper proposes and estimates an interactive fixed effects model of executive compensation, which allows for time-variant pay premiums for unobserved manager attributes. We find that two managerial traits can explain executive compensation over time: talent and conservatism. The market premium for talent is higher in bull markets, as the higher marginal productivity of human capital during these periods increases the demand and thus the price for talents. Such pay premium is concentrated among top talented managers, who earn a premium about five times that of median talented managers. The pay premium for conservatism is linked to the equity market risk premium, with conservatism being discounted (compensated) during the low (high) risk premium periods. We show that risk-taking managers are rewarded during the early period of our sample. However, after the periods characterized by higher risk premium, such as the financial crisis, conservatism becomes a more desirable trait.

We test the limits of arbitrage argument for the survival of irrationality-induced financial anomalies by sorting securities on their individual residual variability as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk – a commonly asserted limit to arbitrage – and comparing the strength of anomalous returns in low versus high residual variability portfolios. We find no support for the limits of arbitrage argument to explain undervaluation anomalies (small value stocks, value stocks generally, recent winners, and positive earnings surprises) but strong support for the limits of arbitrage argument to explain overvaluation anomalies (small growth stocks, growth stocks generally, recent losers, and negative earnings surprises). Other tests also fail to support the limits of arbitrage argument for the survival of overvaluation anomalies and suggest that at least some of the factor premiums for size, book-to-market, and momentum are unrelated to irrationality protected by limits to arbitrage.

We study the role of firm- and manager-specific heterogeneities in executive compensation. We decompose the variation in executive compensation and find that time-invariant firm and, especially, manager fixed effects explain a majority of the variation in executive pay. We then show that in many settings, it is important to include fixed effects to mitigate potential omitted variable bias. Furthermore, we find that compensation fixed effects are significantly correlated with management styles (i.e., manager fixed effects in corporate policies). Finally, the method used in the article has a number of potential applications in financial economics. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: [email protected]., Oxford University Press.

We investigate stock tail risk around national elections worldwide over the period of 1982–2012. We find that firm stock is less likely to crash during the election years, and is more likely to crash during the post-election period. This inter-temporal pattern is consistent with the suppression of negative information when there is heightened political uncertainty around elections and with the subsequent release of adverse news when the uncertainty is reduced. Further analysis shows that the impact of political uncertainty on tail risk is stronger in countries with poorer investor protection, fewer electoral checks and balances, more uncertain election outcomes and pro-business incumbent governments, in industries which are more politically sensitive, and in firms with larger information asymmetry.

ABSTRACT An employee's annual earnings fall by 13% in the first full calendar year after her firm's bankruptcy, and the present value of lost earnings from bankruptcy to six years following bankruptcy is 87% of pre‐bankruptcy annual earnings. More worker earnings are lost in thin labor markets and among small firms. Ex ante compensating wage differentials for this “bankruptcy risk” are up to 2% of firm value for a firm whose credit rating falls from AA to BBB, comparable in magnitude to debt tax benefits. Thus, wage premia for expected costs of bankruptcy are sufficiently large to be an important consideration in capital structure decisions.