One important role of audit committees is to protect external auditors from dismissal following the issuance of an unfavorable report. We examine auditor dismissals following new going-concern reports that Big 6 firms issued between 1988 and 1999. Our findings suggest that audit committees with greater independence, greater governance expertise, and lower stockholdings are more effective in shielding auditors from dismissal after the issuance of new going-concern reports. In addition, we find that the relation between audit committee independence and auditor protection from dismissal has grown stronger over time. Finally, independent audit committee members experience a significant increase in turnover rate after auditor dismissals. These findings, coupled with those from Carcello and Neal (2000), suggest that when affiliated directors dominate the audit committee, management often can (1) pressure its auditor to issue an unmodified report despite going-concern issues, and (2) dismiss its auditor if the auditor refuses to issue an unmodified report.

This study examines the relation between the composition of financially distressed firms' audit committees and the likelihood of receiving going-concern reports. For firms experiencing financial distress during 1994, we find that the greater the percentage of affiliated directors on the audit committee, the lower the probability the auditor will issue a going-concern report. These results support regulators' concern about financial-reporting quality and the recent calls for more independent audit committees.

Recent corporate governance reforms that require audit committees to pre-approve audit and nonaudit services increase audit committees' accountability to third parties for actual auditor independence and audit quality. Other SEC reforms mandate the disclosure of fees for auditor-provided services and are aimed at influencing investors' perceptions of auditor independence. These fee disclosures also reveal audit committees' pre-approval decisions, enhancing public accountability. Thus, audit committees may be less willing to hire auditors for nonaudit services to avoid fee disclosures, even when joint provision improves audit quality. One hundred experienced corporate directors, responding as audit committee members or investors, participated in an experiment in which we manipulated the effect of the auditor's provision of nonaudit services on audit quality and the fee disclosure requirement. We find that audit committee members are more likely to recommend joint provision if audit quality improves, consistent with investors' preferences. However, unlike investors, committee members are more reluctant to recommend joint provision when public disclosures are required, even at the expense of audit quality. These findings offer evidence about an indirect effect of recent reforms.

During the past decade, new regulations have been adopted to improve audit committee effectiveness. Prior research has generally provided evidence in support of these regulations and suggests that a more independent and expert audit committee is more effective. We posit that CEO power reduces or even eliminates the improvements in audit committee effectiveness resulting from independent and financially expert committee members. Thus, CEO power may result in an audit committee that appears effective in form but is not in substance. We construct a composite index for CEO power by combining ten CEO characteristics and employ the incidence of internal control weaknesses as a proxy for audit committee monitoring quality. Since all the firms in our sample have completely independent audit committees, we use financial expertise to examine the impact of CEO power on audit committee effectiveness. We find that, when CEO power is low, audit committee financial expertise is negatively associated with the incidence of internal control weaknesses. However, as CEO power increases, this association monotonically weakens. When CEO power reaches a sufficiently high level, this association is no longer negative. The moderating effect of CEO power on audit committee effectiveness is more prominent when the CEO extracts more rents from the firm through insider trading. Our results are not driven by the CEO 's involvement in director selection. Our paper suggests that more expert audit committees in form do not automatically translate into more effective monitoring. Rather, the substantive monitoring effectiveness of audit committees is contingent on CEO power.

ABSTRACT The elimination of goodwill amortization in 2001 brought about significant change in how companies are required to account for goodwill. This change in accounting also brought with it new challenges for auditors, namely evaluating the reasonableness of management's assumptions related to goodwill valuation. In addition to introducing technical challenges, this task is particularly difficult given the misalignment in incentives it creates between managers who likely prefer to avoid recording an impairment and auditors who seek to minimize the bias in management's impairment testing. This study focuses on the consequences of the misaligned incentives that auditors face under the current goodwill assessment process. We find that the decision to record a goodwill impairment is associated with an increase in the probability of auditor dismissal. Consistent with the presence of significant friction with clients, our results also indicate that the likelihood of auditor dismissals is negatively related to the favorability of the impairment decision. Furthermore, we find that companies impairing goodwill prior to dismissing auditors subsequently employ auditors that are, on average, more favorable to clients in their impairment decisions.

This paper examines the relations between three board characteristics (independence, diligence, and expertise) and Big 6 audit fees for Fortune 1000 companies. To protect its reputation capital, avoid legal liability, and promote shareholder interests, a more independent, diligent, and expert board may demand differentially higher audit quality (greater assurance, which requires more audit work) than the Big 6 audit firms normally provide. The audit fee increases as the auditor's additional costs are passed on to the client, such that we expect positive relations between audit fees and the board characteristics examined. We find significant positive relations between audit fees and board independence, diligence, and expertise. The results persist when similar measures of audit committee “quality” are included in the model. The results add to the growing body of literature documenting relations between corporate governance mechanisms and various facets of the financial reporting and audit processes, as well as to our understanding of the determinants of audit fees.

ABSTRACT Inadequate testing of fair value accounting estimates, including goodwill, is often cited as an audit deficiency in PCAOB inspection reports, and, in some cases, these deficiencies have led to enforcement actions against the auditor. As a result of these issues, the PCAOB recently proposed a new auditing standard for fair value accounting. While these regulatory actions suggest that auditors are challenged by the fair value regime of accounting for goodwill, they also highlight an area where the auditor could be influenced by their financial ties to a client. In this study, we test whether nonaudit fees are associated with goodwill impairment decision outcomes. Our results indicate that the nonaudit fees a client pays are inversely related to the likelihood of impairment in settings where goodwill is likely to be impaired. Additional examinations suggest that the negative relation between nonaudit fees and auditor independence is driven by clients who are most incentivized to exert their influence over the auditor.

Relatively few studies have examined the audit committee oversight process--the activities that link audit committee inputs and financial reporting outcomes. To study this process, we conducted extensive interviews with 42 U.S. public company audit committee members. We explore six audit committee process areas, offer insights into the state of audit committee processes in the post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) environment, and consider our results in light of agency theory and institutional theory; We find that many audit committee members strive to provide effective monitoring of financial reporting and seek to avoid serving on ceremonial audit committees, but within each of the six process areas we find evidence of both substantive monitoring and ceremonial action, such that neither agency theory nor institutional theory fully explains our results. We also find that many responses vary with personal and company characteristics, with particularly notable differences related to audit committee members' accounting expertise and time of appointment to the audit committee (pre-SOX versus post-SOX). We discuss implications and directions for future research and theory development.