Although the Fama–French three-factor model captures most CAPM anomalies, it still fails to explain return momentum. This paper shows that the incorporation of conditioning information into an asset-pricing model is one way to capture return momentum. Results from the conditional regression with linear exposures in the instruments show clear evidence that both small minus big (SMB) and high minus low (HML) risks are time varying and that momentum and reversal return patterns have different time-varying risk characteristics. The conditional Fama–French regression model seems, however, to remain misspecified. Conversely, when the linearity assumption is relaxed and cross-sectional restrictions are imposed, the conditional pricing model appears to capture both short-term momentum and long-term reversal.

We estimate daily Vasicek, CIR, and spline models on Belgian data and compare the trading profits that can be made on the basis of their residuals. Abnormal returns, measured using three different benchmarks, are negatively related to once- and twice-lagged mispricing. Buying underpriced bonds and (especially) selling overpriced bonds yields significant abnormal returns even when the trade is delayed by up to five days after observing the mispricing. The traditional spline model overfits the data and is least able to detect mispricing. Large model residuals are more likely to be the result of model misspecification or -estimation than are small or medium-sized residuals.

We model how a rent-protection motive drives the choice of flotation method in new equity issuance between two polar cases: rights issues and cash offers. Unexpected new blockholders would emerge in control-diluting cash offers and share in jealously guarded control benefits. But rights issues help the incumbent controlling shareholders avoid control dilution and safeguard their private benefits. Under asymmetric information about private benefits, the choice of flotation method can convey information about hidden private benefits and hence firm value. Our model can explain even a negative announcement effect of rights issues, and it supports not just one but three important equilibriums.

We find that growth type (identified by a two-way sort on firm initial market-to-book ratio and asset tangibility) can parsimoniously predict significantly dispersed and persistently distinct future leverage ratios. Growth type is persistent; growth-type-sorted cross-sections of corporate fundamental variables (such as tangible versus intangible investment style) are also meaningfully persistent. As economic and market conditions improve, low growth type firms are keener to issue new debt than equity, whereas high growth type firms are least likely to issue debt and keenest to issue equity. These findings demonstrate that firms rationally invest and seek financing in a manner compatible with their growth types. Consistent with a generalized Myers–Majluf framework, growth type compatibility enables distinct growth types and hence specifications of market imperfection or informational environments to persist. Growth type is apparently a fundamental factor for capital structure persistence.

Acquirer advisors now often arrange syndicated loans financing merger and acquisition deals they advise on. This paper shows that such an advisor-lender dual role facilitates valuable big-ticket deals. There is a positive announcement effect for the acquirer which also shows no systematic post-deal underperformance—dispelling concerns about the advisor abetting managerial empire building. But advisor-led syndicated loans, despite being larger in size, have higher loan spreads than those led by non-advisors. Advisors apparently have an information advantage but rent extraction is unlikely. The higher charges are justifiable in view of the significantly lower post-deal creditworthiness of dual-role bidders. Advisor-lender's superior information about adverse changes in the credit risk is rationally priced into the dual-role interest rate premium.

This paper generalizes the Myers and Majluf (1984) model by introducing an agency cost structure based on private benefits of control. This new model predicts that many corporate finance variables each have opposing effects on under- and overinvestment. Private benefits exacerbate overinvestment but, interestingly, a small amount of private benefits can enhance firm value by alleviating underinvestment. Likewise, an increase in insider ownership alleviates overinvestment but aggravates underinvestment. When private benefits are small, the adverse effect of insider ownership on underinvestment tends to dominate. When there are considerable private benefits, the incentive-alignment effect of insider ownership is pronounced. Additionally, this model reconciles existing equity financing theories on announcement effects. It helps resolve the puzzle that small-growth firms do not seem to have an asymmetric information disadvantage when they issue new equity.

This paper shows how main bank rent extraction affects corporate decisions about investment and financing during financial regulatory reform. Our model predicts that limited loanable funds can initially contain main bank controlled overinvestment, even when new equity is available to the firm. Abundant funds facilitate overinvestment to the detriment of firm profitability. A shift of control rights back to the firm due to financial deregulation produces an “equity for upside potential and bank debt for downside risk” bias against the banks. A stock market and real estate boom in Japan made it harder than ever for the banks to diversify risk. The insights from this analysis help explain why Japan’s main bank system was beneficial in the (capital constrained) postwar period but became harmful during the (capital abundant and even bubbly) 1980s, and why the adverse shocks of the post-deregulation 1990s had such severe effects on the banking system.

In implementing a variance-minimizing cross or delta hedge, the regression coefficient is often estimated using data from the past, but one could also use estimators that are suggested by the random-walk or unbiased-expectations models and require just a single price. We compare the performances of various hedge ratios for three-month currency exposures, and find that the price-based hedge ratios generally perform better than the regression-based ones. Specifically, all our regressions do systematically worse in the case of a delta hedge, and seem to beat the price-based hedge ratios only in the case of cross- or cross-and-delta problems where the two currencies are so distantly related – like, e.g., hedging ITL/USD using JPY/USD – that no risk manager would even consider them as hedges of each other. The poor performance of the regressions is all the more surprising as we correct the futures prices for errors-in-variables (synchronization noise, bid–ask bounce, and changing time to maturity). The results are robust to observation frequency in the regressions, sample period, percentage vs dollar returns, and OLS versus IV. One reason why price-based methods do better is that they provide immediate adjustment to breaks in the data (like EMS realignments, which get incorporated into rolling regression coefficients only very slowly, as time elapses) or other events that change the relationship between the regressor and regressand. For cross or cross-and-delta hedges between European currencies, regressions also have difficulties in capturing cross-correlations between exchange rates.

The literature has documented positive announcement effects for privately placed seasoned equity issues.This study shows positive announcement effects not only for private but also for public placements in Hong Kong. Our unique data offer new insights not obtainable from U.S. data as we examine the cross-sections of the announcement effects. Most importantly, we find that the announcement effect is more likely to be positive for smaller issuers, such as private placing firms and some public issuers where asymmetric information arises more from growth than from assets in place. This finding is consistent with the generalized Myers-Majluf model.

Previous research shows that bank information production mitigates asymmetric information problems. However, this literature has ignored the concern that firms with better growth prospects are more vulnerable to bank rent extraction. This paper points out that funding competition from new equity as an effective natural mechanism solves this important concern. Using Japanese data from 1983 to 1997, we show that the relationship between loan-to-debt ratio and growth, while starting significantly negative (consistent with holdup theory), turns significantly positive towards the high end of the growth spectrum. We confirm that high-growth firms raise more new equity than do low growth firms and use more equity relative to bonds in external finance. This is consistent with a generalized Myers–Majluf framework. These results suggest that for high growth firms, when competition from public debt lessens due to increased growth-based valuations, competition from new equity steps in to restrain bank rent extraction.