Using a large sample of firms from 45 countries, we find that firms in countries with high-climate risk reduce their cash dividends but increasingly use share repurchases to make payouts. The evidence suggests that firms substitute dividends with repurchases to increase their payout flexibility in response to heightened climate risk. Operating volatility and financial constraints are two channels through which climate risk affects firms’ payout flexibility. Further analysis shows that the effect of climate risk on payout flexibility is more pronounced for firms that are more vulnerable to climate risk, and in countries where people are more concerned about climate risk and the national culture emphasizes uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation.

The 2013 depoliticization regulation (Rule 18) in China mandates government officials to resign from board positions in public firms, terminating firms' political connections established through these directors. Exploiting this regulation as a quasi-experiment, we document that politically connected firms increase their cash holdings 12.7% more than non-connected firms because of these resignations. This pattern is more pronounced among firms that rely more heavily on the government for external resources. Among state-owned firms, the pattern is more evident in firms that are more deeply privatized. In addition, firms that lose political ties experience a significant decline in obtaining bank loans and government subsidies, and they are also slower to adjust their cash holdings toward the optimal level. These findings underscore the role of corporate political linkages in facilitating firms' access to resources that “soften” firms' budget constraints.

This article examines the role of CEOs' personal incentives in steering their firms' CSR initiatives following their compensation peers, subsequently influencing their career trajectories within their current firms. Specifically, we find that firms exhibit better corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance if their compensation peer (CP) firms demonstrated superior CSR performance in the prior year (i.e., the CP effect). To mitigate the endogeneity concern, we conduct analyses based on the termination (initiation) of CPs' peer relation with the focal firm, a benchmark test, and an instrumental variable analysis. To establish the mechanisms of internal monetary rewards from their firms and enhanced external career tournaments in the labor market, we show the CP effect is stronger if the focal company CEOs have compensation contracts specifying CSR performance targets, face a larger compensation shortfall relative to their CP counterparts, operate in closer geographical proximity to those CP CEOs, or hire more compensation consultants. Furthermore, we find that the probability and quantity of CSR contracts received by focal firms' CEOs increase with CPs' lagged CSR. CEOs receive higher compensation than those in CP firms after they deliver better CSR performance than their CPs. Overall, our paper highlights the role of CEOs' personal incentives in steering their firms' CSR initiatives, subsequently influencing their career trajectories within their current organizations.