In this paper, I examine the impact of partner technological diversity and alliance organizational form on firm innovative performance. Using a sample of 463 R&D alliances in the telecommunications equipment industry, I find that alliances contribute far more to firm innovation when technological diversity is moderate, rather than low or high. Although this relationship holds irrespective of alliance organization, I find that hierarchical organization, such as an equity joint venture, improves firm benefits from alliances with high levels of technological diversity. Thus, alliance organizational form likely influences partner ability and incentives to share information, which affects performance.

The article examines whether the discipline of management science has placed an undue emphasis on the development of theory at the expense of research which observes and reports actual facts. It is well known that the leading scholarly periodicals in the field require articles to contribute to management science theory to be accepted for publication. This unnecessarily limits research, since the collection of previously unknown facts by itself will contribute to the development of theory. The bad effect forced theoretical discussion has on the comprehensibility and readability of academic writing is noted. Articles in scholarly periodicals in related fields such as marketing research and finance which introduce previously unknown facts are presented as a comparison. There is said to be an inherent contradiction in the emphasis of pure theory in a field devoted to the study of real world decision making.

We unpack the concept of managerial risk taking, distinguishing among three of its major elements: the size of an outlay, the variance of potential outcomes, and the likelihood of extreme loss. We then apply our framework in hypothesizing the effects of CEO stock options on strategic behavior and company performance. We find that CEO stock options engender high levels of investment outlays and bring about extreme corporate performance (big gains and big losses), suggesting that stock options prompt CEOs to make high-variance bets, not simply larger bets. Finally, we find that option-loaded CEOs deliver more big losses than big gains.

Agency theory highlights losses in productivity that may occur when the interests of owners and employees are imperfectly aligned. Pay for performance has been proposed as a solution to this problem. Using a real—effort laboratory experiment with salient incentives, we compared pay—for—performance and fixed—salary compensation. The former achieved significantly higher firm productivity through both sorting and incentive effects. In particular, more productive employees selected pay for performance, and employees on average, regardless of their preferred compensation scheme, produced more under it. However, more risk—averse individuals were less likely to select pay for performance and less responsive to its incentives.

Research on roles and identities generally represents a micro perspective that does not account for the reconstruction of professional role identity, owing to insufficient attention to institutional forces. We trace institutional influences on professional role identity reconstruction and extend theory by building bridges across institutional, organizational, and individual levels of analysis. Findings indicate that agentic reconstruction of professional role identity is enabled and constrained by an institutional environment that provides interpretive, legitimating, and material resources that professionals adopt and adapt. Institutional forces also impact organizational arrangements that further influence microlevel agency. We elaborate interactions among these three levels of analysis.

This study reanalyzes data from Tepper's (2000) two-wave study regarding the effects of subordinates' perceptions of supervisory abuse to assess previously unexamined relationships.As predicted, we found that subordinates who more rather than less strongly perceived that they had been abused by supervisors tended to use regulative maintenance tactics with higher frequency.Further, the positive relationship between

This article explores multilevel relationships between group-level OCB, individual-level OCB, and work performance. We also discuss conceptualizing OCB with regard to context and multiple levels of analysis. We hypothesize that group-level OCB moderates the relationship between individual-level OCB and job performance. Results based on 100 work groups in a manufacturing firm indicate that group-level OCB significantly moderated the relationship between individual-level OCB and job performance. Comparing contexts in which group-level OCB was rare with those in which it was prevalent, we found that high individual-level OCB yielded greater significant increases in job performance ratings when group-level OCB was rare.

This study reanalyzes data from Tepper's (2000) two-wave study regarding the effects of subordinates' perceptions of supervisory abuse to assess previously unexamined relationships. As predicted, we found that subordinates who more rather than less strongly perceived that they had been abused by supervisors tended to use regulative maintenance tactics with higher frequency. Further, the positive relationship between abusive supervision and subordinates' psychological distress was exacerbated by subordinates' use of regulative maintenance communications, and that relationship was reduced by subordinates' use of direct maintenance communication. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.