We integrate social exchange theory with social capital theory to present a resource-based contingency model of when team–member exchange (TMX) helps individual performance in teams. We argue that strong TMX produces obligations to utilize resources (e.g., task information) provided by one’s teammates, and these obligations enhance performance when (a) teammates provide resources of high quality or (b) the quality of resources available from individuals outside of the TMX relationship (i.e., the leader) are low, purportedly because TMX-based obligations protect individuals from over-utilizing low-quality resources from the leader. We tested our model in two studies. In Study 1, multisource team data revealed that TMX enhanced member performance when teammates possessed attributes associated with high-quality resources (i.e., high cognitive ability) or when the leader did not. In Study 2, we replicated these findings in a scenario experiment, showing that TMX impacted performance under different resource conditions via felt obligation to utilize teammates’ resources. Our findings advance the literature by delineating the teammate- and leader-resource conditions under which TMX benefits member performance, as well as demonstrating that felt obligation to utilize teammates’ resources is an important mechanism underlying these effects. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.

In this study, we examine knowledge dependence, a unique form of external dependence firms face when they pursue new technologies. Our focus is on the formation of interorganizational ties as a means to manage the firm’s knowledge dependence. Studying the board interlock ties of 717 technology-based firms in 2002–2006, we find that tie formation is more likely when an external counterpart is more closely aligned with the global trajectory of the focal firm’s core technology and when the counterpart is more active in defending its intellectual property in this area. As a result of the interlock, the firm is more likely to gain access to the counterpart firm’s knowledge resources through research and development alliances and forestall litigation barriers in the use of core technologies. Our findings provide important theoretical implications for the unique role of knowledge resources in interorganizational dependence and tie formation.

Prior research into the effects of cultural differences between multinational enterprises’ (MNEs’) home and host countries on expatriate staffing decisions in foreign subsidiaries has produced a large number of conflicting findings. We address some of these conflicting findings and aim to advance theory in two ways. First, we draw on transaction cost economics to explain why and how the effects of cultural distance on the proportion of expatriate parent-country nationals form a curvilinear relationship, instead of a linear one as commonly proposed. Second, we integrate the values-based cultural distance concept with the norms-based tightness–looseness concept. This allows us to simultaneously account for cultural differences between countries and location-bound normative cultural effects within countries, which cannot be overcome solely through expatriate learning and adaptation. Using a large global dataset of Japanese MNEs, we find support for a convex relationship between cultural distance and the proportion of expatriate parent-country nationals. We also find a moderating (steepening) effect of tightness–looseness on this relationship. The results reconcile some of the tensions between the subjectivists’ values-based approach, which positions culture in the shared cognitions realm, and the structuralists’ approach, which places culture in a normative situational environment.

Board leadership has always been conceptualized as a tradeoff between two desirable yet mutually exclusive organizational attributes. Classical organization theory prescribes unity of command, achieved by combining the chief executive officer (CEO) and board chair positions; in contrast, agency theory prescribes independent monitoring, achieved by separating the CEO and board chair positions. Extant theory does not acknowledge the possibility that a compromise might exist between these competing theoretical prescriptions, one which might reduce their mutual exclusivity. Such a compromise has emerged in practice, however: the lead independent director. In the present research, we initiate theoretical exploration of this compromise between the prescriptions of agency theory and classical organization theory, addressing the questions of when a board will choose to appoint a lead independent director, who among the independent directors will serve in the position, how lead independent director appointment will impact firm performance, and whether this compromise is a permanent solution or a stepping stone to a more extreme outcome. Analysis of S&P 1500 firms from 2002 to 2012 reveals that lead independent director appointment reflects balanced power on the board, impacts firm performance positively under the right conditions, and generally becomes institutionalized as a permanent governance structure.

Abundant research has documented a gender pay gap; women earn less than men, all else being equal. Against the backdrop of an overall female penalty, we propose that the widespread adoption of diversity goals in organizations creates a female premium for certain women. We integrate the economic principle of supply and demand with theory from the field of strategic human resource management and theorize that individuals perceive high-potential women—who have the abilities needed to reach the upper echelons of organizations, where women remain underrepresented—as more valuable for achieving organizational diversity goals than high-potential men and, in turn, reward them with higher pay. Two field studies (Studies 1 and 3) and two laboratory experiments (Studies 2 and 4) reveal a female premium that is unique to high-potential women (Studies 1 and 2), driven by perceptions that high-potential women have more diversity value than high-potential men (Studies 2 and 4), and larger in contexts where diversity goals are stronger (Studies 3 and 4). Our theory and findings challenge the assumption that the gender pay gap uniformly disadvantages women and offer new insight into why and when the female penalty reverses and becomes a female premium.

Research has consistently demonstrated that organizational citizenship behaviors (OCBs) produce a wide array of positive outcomes for employees and organizations. Recent work, however, has suggested that employees often engage in OCBs not because they want to but because they feel they have to, and it is not clear whether OCBs performed for external motives have the same positive effects on individuals and organizational functioning as do traditional OCBs. In this article, we draw from self-determination and moral licensing theories to suggest a potential negative consequence of OCB. Specifically, we argue that when employees feel compelled to engage in OCB by external forces, they will subsequently feel psychologically entitled for having gone above and beyond the call of duty. Furthermore, these feelings of entitlement can act as moral credentials that psychologically free employees to engage in both interpersonal and organizational deviance. Data from two multisource field studies and an online experiment provide support for these hypotheses. In addition, we demonstrate that OCB-generated feelings of entitlement transcend organizational boundaries and lead to deviance outside of the organization.