We introduce the theory of contrastive explanation, the core argument of which is that we do not explain an entire phenomenon but only aspects of it. Using the example of transaction cost economics, we illustrate how contrastive explanation can assist organizational researchers in creating, broadening, and deepening their theories through posing suitable contrastive questions. We summarize our discussion into eight heuristic rules that will serve as useful theory-building tools.

As organizational environments become more global, dynamic, and competitive, contradictory demands intensify. To understand and explain such tensions, academics and practitioners are increasingly adopting a paradox lens. We review the paradox literature, categorizing types and highlighting fundamental debates. We then present a dynamic equilibrium model of organizing, which depicts how cyclical responses to paradoxical tensions enable sustainability—peak performance in the present that enables success in the future. This review and the model provide the foundation of a theory of paradox.

As organizational environments become more global, dynamic, and competitive, contradictory demands intensify. To understand and explain such tensions, academics and practitioners are increasingly adopting a paradox lens. We review the paradox literature, categorizing types and highlighting fundamental debates. We then present a dynamic equilibrium model of organizing, which depicts how cyclical responses to paradoxical tensions enable sustainability—peak performance in the present that enables success in the future. This review and the model provide the foundation of a theory of paradox.

We extend real options research by introducing the concept of collective real options and model how collective real options provide strategic alliances a mechanism to manage social uncertainty. Collective real options manage social uncertainty by producing relational small wins that develop trust. The amount of trust developed by acquiring a collective real option depends on the exposure of alliance partners. Alliance partner reputation also plays an important role in the impact of collective real options.

We extend real options research by introducing the concept of collective real options and model how collective real options provide strategic alliances a mechanism to manage social uncertainty.Collective real options manage social uncertainty by producing relational small wins that develop trust.The amount of trust developed by acquiring a collective real option depends on the exposure of alliance partners.Alliance partner reputation also plays an important role in the impact of collective real options.

We propose linkages among human resource (HR) systems, relational climates, and employee helping behavior. We suggest that HR systems promote relational climates varying in terms of the motivation and sustenance of helping behavior, and we expect HR systems to indirectly influence the nature of relationships and the character of helping within organizations. By considering HR systems and their respective relational climates together, researchers can gain a better understanding of expectations and dynamics surrounding helping behavior.

We investigate the organizational pursuit of seemingly impossible goals - commonly known as stretch goals. Building from our analysis of the mechanisms through which stretch goals could influence organizational learning and performance, we offer a contingency framework evaluating which organizations are positioned to benefit from such extreme goals, and which are most likely to pursue them. We conclude that stretch goals are, paradoxically, most seductive for organizations that can least afford the risks associated with them.

We investigate the organizational pursuit of seemingly impossible goals—commonly known as stretch goals. Building from our analysis of the mechanisms through which stretch goals could influence organizational learning and performance, we offer a contingency framework evaluating which organizations are positioned to benefit from such extreme goals and which are most likely to pursue them. We conclude that stretch goals are, paradoxically, most seductive for organizations that can least afford the risks associated with them.