Knowledge that Transforms

While budgetary controls with capital rationing are theoretically optimal and widespread in practice, empirical research documents their association with higher employee dishonesty compared to budgetary controls without rationing. In this study, we examine whether combining budgetary controls with mission statements in a system of management controls decreases employee dishonesty. We predict that the system's effect on dishonesty depends on the interaction of the social norms conveyed by each control instrument within the system. We study two types of budgetary controls that differ in whether they include budget rationing and two types of mission statements that differ in whether they emphasize integrity or fi nancial values. We provide experimental evidence that mission statements reduce employee dishonesty more if combined with budget rationing controls than non-rationing budgetary controls. This effect is enhanced when the mission statement conveys a norm of integrity, as opposed to a norm of fi nancial performance. Our results suggest that mission statements can mitigate the downsides of budget rationing, but this effect is less pronounced when the norms conveyed by each instrument are redundant.

While multinational firms invest large amounts of money in employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) to reduce turnover, there is little evidence regarding ESOPs' effectiveness in retaining rank-and-file employees and none on a global scale. Building on psychological ownership (PO) arguments, we predict that a rank-and-file employee's ESOP participation will be negatively associated with a firm exit decision and that this effect will be stronger in contextual settings that are more conducive to turnover. For our analysis, we used internal data from a large multinational firm covering 190,453 rank-and-file employees and approximately 650,000 employee years. We find that ESOP participation is associated with a lower likelihood of individual firm exit decisions. We also find this effect to be more pronounced in countries with favorable labor market conditions and lower uncertainty avoidance (UA). Additional tests support our argument that PO arising from ESOP participation is particularly important for rank-and-file employees, who often only invest small amounts. Overall, our study provides cross-country evidence regarding the retention effect of ESOP participation for rank-and-file employees.

The paper seeks to enhance our understanding of the interaction between the development of disciplinary power in western liberal society and Foucault's writings on governmentality, through examination of the political processes resulting from the largest public scandal in the UK, the Poulson scandal of the early 1970s. The first research motive is to uncover any additional insights or hidden understandings that can be derived by applying Foucauldian historiographical and governmental perspectives as strengthened by Dean's (2010) analytics of government to the history of corporate governance in English local authorities over the forty years following Poulson. We argue that the continual process of intervention, investigation and prescription by central government set in motion by the scandal resulted in an increase in disciplinary power within local government by changing the expectations of council officials, elected representatives and politicians in Westminster through the normalisation of these intrusions and the spirit of dependency and compliance which resulted. Secondly, the paper examines the strengths and weaknesses of the analytics approach in a complex situation involving many genealogical disruptions to the status quo over a long time-period; and whilst the paper found the method helpful, limitations emerged regarding its claims to empirical certainty through precise questioning. Finally, the paper examines the significance of countering corruption as a motivating factor in the rise of disciplinary power in English local government, which it finds as limited.

In levers of control (LoC) research, empirical and conceptual ambiguities have hampered the establishment of a coherent body of knowledge. Mixed findings, variability in the approaches to account for the levers’ combined use, and variability in conceptual choices (e.g., the conceptualization of interactive and diagnostic control) have caused this unsatisfactory state. In response, we validate and extend theory on the LoC framework by meta-analytically synthesizing quantitative evidence from 58 independent samples and 10,374 observations. We develop two models of the combined use of the levers, which portray their simultaneous use and mutual relationships, and relate them to capabilities and performance. For theory validation, we uncover stylized facts that demonstrate that organizations use the four levers in combination, not in isolation. Moreover, following the logic of the resource-based view, the levers are related to performance via capabilities. These relationships are robust to moderating influences of the dimensions and conceptualization of interactive control and managers’ hierarchical level. For theory extension, we systematically uncover the need to complement the resource-based view with other theories and offer related suggestions. Our moderator analyses identify boundary conditions that limit the generalizability of the LoC framework. For example, surprisingly, the conceptualization of diagnostic control emerges as a boundary condition. On a general level, our findings might serve as an inspiration for better appreciating future survey-based knowledge creation in management control research and also provide researchers from other disciplines with a more comprehensive understanding of the enhancement of capabilities and performance.

We introduce a novel Big Data analytics model to detect upward revenue misreporting. The model uses freely available Google searches of firm products to provide external entity business state (EBS) evidence. The veracity of the reported numbers is enhanced when auditors can obtain external EBS evidence congruent with the reported numbers. The Google search volume index (SVI) of firm products is a good candidate for such EBS evidence because it nowcasts (i.e. predicts present) firm sales and is independent of management control. A large discrepancy such as a high sales growth together with a large decline in the SVI suggests possible manipulation upwards of revenues. We find that an indicator variable, MUP, of a firm in the top sales growth quartile and bottom ΔSVI quartile in each industry-quarter predicts revenue misstatements incrementally to the F_Score, Discretionary-Revenues model, two alternative upward revenue manipulation identifiers, and analyst and media coverages. MUP predictability is stronger in end-user industries and in interim quarters relative to the fourth quarter. We also find corroborating evidence that MUP firms have lower sales growth persistence, larger increases in accounts receivables, and lower allowances for bad debts, consistent with their lower revenue quality.