Knowledge that Transforms

Audit academics and policymakers express ongoing concerns about limited knowledge transfer between audit research and policymaking. We use theory-based knowledge transfer norms to evaluate eight practices used by audit academics to transfer research knowledge to policymakers. The discontinued PCAOB-AAA Auditing Section “Research Synthesis Project” came closest to enacting these theory-based knowledge transfer norms. Hence, we examine why those involved in that project did not follow these norms. Interviews with project authors reveal that their review creation approach anchored on the traditional academic literature review, and insufficiently adjusted it to meet the goal of communicating audit research evidence to policymakers. However, interviews with PCAOB project liaisons indicate that policymakers were engaged with and found value in the review creation process. Thus, we analyze PCAOB rulemaking documents for evidence that policymakers valued and used the project’s reviews in their policymaking. Over the project’s duration, we find increasing citations of research to the reviews themselves and to a broader set of academic research. Our findings of knowledge transfer occurrence in this project warrant further research on the efficacy of mobilizing audit research via research syntheses. We also show how several current audit domain knowledge transfer practices can be combined with the research syntheses approach leading to systematic effective knowledge transfer to policymakers.

The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) reports that a male favoring pay gap exists in every one of its member countries. To reduce the gender pay gap, governments and investors are demanding that companies disclose gender pay information. While companies seem to resist these demands, there is little evidence about how investors might react to the disclosure of gender pay information. We draw on theories of fairness and the instrumental perspective of corporate social responsibility activities to predict how the disclosure of gender pay information influences investor judgments. Our experimental findings indicate investors are more willing to invest in a company that discloses gender pay equity compared to either a company disclosing a gender pay gap or one disclosing no gender pay information. Further, our mediation analyses results show a sequential mediation process whereby the gender pay disclosure affects perceptions of fairness (economic consequences) directly (indirectly through fairness), with only perceptions of the economic consequences resulting from the gender pay disclosure directly influencing willingness to invest. In addition, despite the presence of the same sequential mediation relationship, we find limited evidence investors are less willing to invest in a company that discloses a typical gender pay gap compared to a company disclosing no gender pay information. Two additional experiments indicate it is the information about gender pay, not its disclosure by the company, that influences investors; and the effect is intentional. Our results are consistent with investors anticipating real economic consequences from the disclosure of gender pay information.

Accounting research on tax has primarily focused on documenting the income shifting strategies of multinational corporations. However, no studies, as far as we are aware, have hitherto explored how large accountancy firms manage their own tax affairs despite being huge economic entities in their own right. Using a unique private firm dataset of Big 4 affiliated firms from 30 European countries we examine whether the Big 4 shift income among their separate legal entities. Despite apparent disincentives to doing so, we find archival evidence consistent with tax-motivated income shifting. Difference-in-difference specifications around the incorporation of Deloitte EMEA in the U.K. and PwC Europe in Germany provide further evidence consistent with income shifting increasing among Deloitte and PwC affiliates subsequent to the incorporation of their respective regional coordinating entities. In cross-sectional analyses we find evidence consistent with incentives to engage in outbound income shifting being weaker for unprofitable affiliates. We also provide evidence consistent with the Big 4 engaging in income shifting only in countries with favourable tax conditions/weak tax enforcement. Finally, we find evidence in line with debt allocation and intangible asset placement being important channels through which the Big 4 achieve their income shifting objectives. Our study contributes to the literature by being the first to open the black box of the Big 4's own tax planning practices.

Using an experiment, I examine whether managers have preferences for corporate social responsibility (CSR) in a capital budgeting setting and the factors that influence the extent to which they act on these preferences. I find that managers have and act on preferences for CSR by reporting to implement higher cost CSR investments that reduce firm profit even when they have financial incentives not to do so. I also find that when managers need to misreport to act on their preferences for CSR, their willingness to act on such preferences is decreased due to a desire to be honest. Conversely, an opportunity to create slack for personal benefit increases managers’ willingness to act on their CSR preferences, offsetting the decrease resulting from honesty concerns. Together these findings demonstrate that managers’ preferences for CSR investments can influence behavior even in the presence of competing economic incentives and social norms. Finally, an analysis of firm profit shows that firms may be better off financially with managers who act on preferences for CSR investments rather than managers who have strong preferences for wealth. This result obtains because managers with strong CSR preferences do not create slack to the same extent as managers with strong preferences for wealth. These results have implications for both theory and practice because they show that managers’ reports used to make investment decisions are influenced by their personal CSR preferences.

In response to general calls for increased transparency in society, pay transparency policies are growing in importance. Given that pay transparency unavoidably gives employees the opportunity to make comparisons between themselves and others, in this study we address the question of how these comparisons impact the incentive effects of performance contingent pay, and consequently their performance outcomes. Specifically, we empirically examine whether horizontal pay dispersion alters the effectiveness of performance-based pay contracts, which firms typically use to incentivize effort. Exploiting our unique access to a large healthcare provider, we document the moderating role of horizontal pay dispersion on the effectiveness of individual monetary incentives at generating increased individual performance. To provide a more nuanced understanding of the moderating effect of pay dispersion, we further examine the boundary conditions of the proposed interaction. In particular, we examine the differential effect of overall pay dispersion on employees that rank high versus low in the pay distribution and disaggregate overall pay dispersion into performance-related versus performance-unrelated pay dispersion. Our findings consistently show a positive moderating effect of pay dispersion when employees are more likely to consider the observed pay dispersion as legitimate, and a negative moderation effect when this is less likely the case. Our study strengthens the understanding of how individual level incentives function in the context of a multi-person firm setting. Our results document that individual incentives are effective, but also suggest that pay dispersion can have a significant influence on the incentive-performance relation. These findings provide some evidence that individuals are concerned not only with their own payout, but also with that of others, and that this concern has a significant impact on individual’s effort provision, and consequently performance.

Existing studies have developed increasingly sophisticated accounts of the performative agency of valuation devices and their effects on markets and organizations. In particular, research has focused on the work of different actors to legitimize valuation devices and ensure their adoption, which then leads to performativity. This paper extends work on the legitimacy and performativity of valuation devices by developing a dynamic, non-linear theorization of the boundary conditions of performativity and the feedbacks that result in changes in performativity over time. We ask: How do evolutions in a valuation device’s legitimacy relate to its performativity? Our analysis is based on a longitudinal study of the profits per equity partner (PEP) metric which between 1995 and 2013 became established as a key valuation device for English law firms. Through this case we draw attention to the dynamic legitimacy-performativity nexus . We show how the waxing and waning of different forms of legitimacy, in line with the dynamics of the broader institutional environment, affect the performativity of a particular valuation device. We also reveal a performativity paradox . The more a device gains legitimacy the more it becomes influential and exercises performative effects. The more this happens, the more the risk that tensions, contradictions and challenges will arise and begin to undermine the valuation device’s legitimacy and consequently its performativity. Consequently, we contribute to better theorizing the dynamic links between legitimacy, performativity and counter-performativity.

This study is about auditors’ role as regulatory intermediaries in the international accounting standard-setting process. Drawing from the socio-legal literature, we use a theoretical framework combining the Regulator-Intermediary-Target (RIT) model and the legal endogeneity theory that sheds light on auditors’ role in fostering the emergence of an agreed-upon meaning of a standard. While standards are open to different possible interpretations at implementation stage, we argue that standard-setting is a critical step at which a significant part of standard’s meaning is locked in. Hence the importance of discussions over the substance and wording of standards for parties involved in the due process. We investigate auditors’ support to their clients engaging in such discussions leading to the co-construction of the standard’s meaning and thus to the potential endogenization of the standard. For this purpose, the IASB due process is conceptualized as a regulatory conversation (Black, 2002). We use a single case study carried out in the office of one large accounting firm. Our examination focuses on discussions between the IASB and telecommunications industry representatives around the draft IFRS 15 on revenue recognition, as depicted by the latter’s auditors. We find that auditors from the firm’s in-house consulting network play a pivotal role in assisting field auditors and their clients engaging with the IASB while preserving the firm’s reputation. Taken as a whole, our findings suggest that auditors played a pivotal role as intermediaries between the IASB (the regulator) and the targets (Telco firms) and as such contributed to the partial endogenization of the draft IFRS 15. We discuss the implications of our findings for conceptualizing auditor’s role in accounting standard-setting.

Prospect theory is often used to predict individuals’ risky tax decisions. For example, individuals who are in a tax due (refund) position are predicted to engage in more (less) tax noncompliance. This is known as the “withholding phenomenon”. However, tax noncompliance is not just risky, it is also unethical. We hypothesize that because there is an ethical component inherent in this risky decision, the feelings described by prospect theory are insufficient to cause increased risk-seeking. In a series of experiments, we show that moral disengagement is the primary theoretical mechanism that explains noncompliant tax behavior. The feelings evoked from being in a loss domain provide motivation for individuals to morally disengage, while moral disengagement is directly related to noncompliant tax behavior. We also develop an intervention that deters individuals from morally disengaging, specifically when they are in a tax due position. These results have important practical and theoretical implications.