In this article, we draw on the writings of Nigerian-born sociologist Peter P. Ekeh and, using extensive and hard-to-reach fieldwork data, we seek to understand how members of the Civic Public—the political and business elite—managed to obscure and obfuscate their corruption via accounting tools and strategies at the expense of the communities they serve, i.e., the Primordial Public. We find that members of the Civic Public engaged in a series of accounting schemes—some simple, others complex—to divert vast sums of much-needed funds away from the intended beneficiaries of a major charitable initiative established to provide aid for the un(der)-employed youth of Ghana. We make important contributions to the study of accounting, corruption, and morality. First, we disaggregate amorality from morality, situating these terms both theoretically and contextually, before discussing how members of the primordial public are systemically and culturally socialized to the elite's amorality. We build on and extend Ekeh's arguments in two ways. First, we discuss the emergence of a third public, which we call the “In-between”. Second, we argue that members of this third public are increasingly at risk of being dragged into morally dubious actions by and on behalf of their elite peers as they are persuaded toward morally dubious actions and behaviours.

Prior accounting and economics research suggests that tournaments with highly concentrated prizes attract the most talented individuals. However, this research assumes that tournament entrants have granular, reliable information about their relative skill level. Using a laboratory experiment, we replicate this result: when relative skill information is available, prize concentration leads to skill-based selection. However, when relative skill information is unavailable, and tournament choice is public, we find that highly concentrated prizes instead attract more narcissistic individuals. Together, our results suggest that high-level positions with exceptionally large prizes can attract narcissistic applicants when entry decisions are publicly observable and relative skill information is limited. These findings inform both theory and practice by clarifying when tournament prize concentration selects for skill versus personality.