Extreme work hours in professional service firms (PSFs) are often attributed to organizational control mechanisms such as time sheets, utilization targets, and performance evaluations. This paper introduces the concept of the entrainment cycle to explore how these controls foster professionals' compliance with extreme work patterns. The entrainment cycle explains how individuals become continuously synchronized with the collective rhythm of the organization. Drawing on 159 interviews with 81 professionals across two PSFs, the study explores how formal and normative controls synchronize individuals with the fast-paced organizational tempo. The findings reveal how bureaucratic and cultural entrainment mechanisms contribute to synchronization. Moreover, emotions and bodily responses play a critical role in making professionals internalize the organization's rhythms. Periods of synchronization trigger positive feedback loops in which heightened emotions and bodily responses reinforce individuals' attachment to work. These synchronized periods contrast with moments of desynchronization in which professionals experience negative feedback loops characterized by guilt, anxiety, and physical withdrawal symptoms. The bodily and emotional mechanisms this study reveals reinforce professionals' synchronization with collective rhythms, locking them into an entrainment cycle that perpetuates long hours and ever-intensifying work. This study offers new insights into how controls affect individuals and organizations in significant, far-reaching, and often unobtrusive ways.

In this study, we experimentally investigate how managers' budget reporting behavior is influenced by two important features of the budgeting system: the measurement basis used in budget preparation (i.e., whether managers make budget reports in financial or nonfinancial measures) and managers' slack benefits in budget execution (i.e., whether managers benefit from budgetary slack directly or through an intermediate activity). While prior research suggests that moral self-regulation helps promote honest behavior, we predict that a financial measurement basis undermines moral self-regulation by strengthening the manager's desire to advance self-interest and that the absence of direct slack benefits undermines moral self-regulation by making misreporting more justifiable. We also predict that the effects of these two budgetary features on honesty are non-additive, due to the manager's diminishing marginal net utility from misreporting. Experimental results are consistent with our predictions. The implications of our findings for management accounting theory and practice are discussed.

Using alcohol, tobacco, and gaming consumption data and people’s attitudes toward these sin products to proxy for social norm acceptance levels, we show a strong interaction effect between social norms and financial incentives, which significantly influence the behavior of market participants. Specifically, institutional investors’ shareholdings and analyst coverage of sin companies increase with the degree of social norm acceptance. The association between shareholdings/coverage and social norm acceptance is less pronounced for firms with higher future expected performance. Our results show that social norms and financial incentives have a powerful interaction effect in determining the behavior of market participants, suggesting that social norms can be crossed when motive and opportunity exist.