Firms increasingly respond to stakeholder demands by making public claims about their stances on polarizing issues, but at the same time their political activities may contradict their claims. We analyze the extent to which firms' sociopolitical claims and their political action committee contributions align. We develop a dictionary of claims related to diversity and environmental protection based on word combinations in firm communications and link firms' political contributions to candidate approval ratings provided by third-party advocacy groups. While firms generally donate mostly to lower-rated politicians (i.e., those with lower environmental and human rights ratings), firms making more sociopolitical claims donate relatively more to higher-rated politicians. The latter is consistent with political alignment but also has further limit: While firms with more claims donate more to higher-rated politicians, they donate no less to lower-rated politicians. Moreover, government subsidies, politicians’ power, and community pressure for diversity and environmental disclosures reduce political alignment.

Many organizations have professional employees on fixed-term and ongoing employment contracts. While hiring employees on fixed-term contracts offers organizations operational flexibility and other benefits, it also brings about challenges in the form of relatively lower goal alignment and ability of these employees, thus creating the need for management controls. At the same time, given the costs and constraints of designing and implementing a control system, we expect that the planned use of fixed-term workers would be affected by the type of control environment that organizations are willing or able to create. Hence, this study investigates whether an organization's choice of its control environment and its use of fixed-term professional employees are interdependent (i.e., made jointly). Using surveys from different sources and archival data from the education sector, we find that some types of controls (i.e., action controls and organizational culture) and the organization's choice of using fixed-term employees are interdependent, while other controls (i.e., employee selection practices and results control) are independent of this choice. We also find that the interdependence between the choice of using fixed-term employees and the control environment is generally weaker when organizations use fixed-term contracts as an implicit screening mechanism for ongoing employment. Finally, in additional analysis, we find evidence that the interdependence between controls and the use of fixed-term employees is primarily due to concerns related to goal alignment rather than ability.