We adopt an interactionist logic to study the determinants of risk taking by chief executive officers (CEOs). We introduce the concept of “capability cues”—contextual signals that decision makers might reasonably interpret as indicators of their current level of overall ability—arguing that positive cues will induce boldness, while negative cues will induce timidity. Then, drawing from prior theory about how narcissists react to stimuli, we hypothesize that highly narcissistic CEOs will be relatively unresponsive to objective indicators of their performance; in contrast, highly narcissistic CEOs will be exceptionally emboldened by social praise (in the forms of media praise and media awards). We test our theory in two distinct studies, one of risky outlays by CEOs of publicly owned U.S. companies from 1992 to 2006, and a second of acquisition premiums paid by CEOs of a sample of U.S. acquiring firms, 2001–2008. Our analyses show that capability cues generally influence executive risk taking, but highly narcissistic CEOs are much less responsive to recent objective performance than their less narcissistic peers; in contrast, highly narcissistic CEOs are especially bolstered by social praise.

This study uses unobtrusive measures of the narcissism of chief executive officers (CEOs)—the prominence of the CEO's photograph in annual reports, the CEO's prominence in press releases, the CEO's use of first-person singular pronouns in interviews, and compensation relative to the second-highest-paid firm executive—to examine the effect of CEO narcissism on a firm's strategy and performance. Results of an empirical study of 111 CEOs in the computer hardware and software industries in 1992–2004 show that narcissism in CEOs is positively related to strategic dynamism and grandiosity, as well as the number and size of acquisitions, and it engenders extreme and fluctuating organizational performance. The results suggest that narcissistic CEOs favor bold actions that attract attention, resulting in big wins or big losses, but that, in these industries, their firms' performance is generally no better or worse than firms with non-narcissistic CEOs.

We examine the mechanisms used to limit expropriation of firm wealth by large shareholders among S&P 500 firms with founding-family ownership. Consistent with agency theory, we find that the most valuable public firms are those in which independent directors balance family board representation. In contrast, in firms with continued founding-family ownership and relatively few independent directors, firm performance is significantly worse than in non-family firms. We also find that a moderate family board presence provides substantial benefits to the firm. Additional tests suggest that families often seek to minimize the presence of independent directors, while outside shareholders seek independent director representation. These findings highlight the importance of independent directors in mitigating conflicts between shareholder groups and imply that the interests of minority investors are best protected when, through independent directors, they have power relative to family shareholders. We argue that expanding the discussion beyond manager-shareholder conflicts to include conflicts between shareholder groups provides a richer setting in which to explore corporate governance and the balance of power in U.S. firms.

Arguing that knowledge in the social sciences is socially constructed through the selective interpretation of major works, we examine the fate of a classic article in organizational theory, DiMaggio and Powell's 1983 essay on institutional isomorphism. We show that one aspect of this article, the discussion of mimetic isomorphism, has received attention disproportionate to its role in the essay. A detailed examination of 26 articles in which researchers attempted to operationalize various components of DiMaggio and Powell's model shows that measures used to capture one of their concepts could have served as valid measures of one of the others. Findings show that DiMaggio and Powell's thesis has become socially constructed, as authors have selectively appropriated aspects of the work that accord with prevalent discourse in the field, and that centrally located researchers in sociology and organizational behavior are more likely than other scholars to invoke this dominant interpretation of their article.