I model the equilibrium risk sharing between countries with varying financial development. The most financially developed country takes greater risks because its financial intermediaries deal with funding problems better. In good times, the more financially developed country consumes more and runs a trade deficit financed by the higher financial income that it earns as compensation for taking greater risk. During global crises, it suffers heavier losses. Its currency emerges as the reserve currency because it appreciates during crises, thus providing a good hedge. I provide evidence that financial net worth plays a crucial role in understanding this asymmetric risk sharing.

We empirically characterize how China is internationalizing its bond market by staggering the entry of different types of foreign investors into its domestic market and propose a dynamic reputation model to explain this strategy. Our framework rationalizes China’s strategy as trying to build credibility as a safe issuer while reducing the cost of capital flight. We use our framework to shed light on China’s response to episodes of capital outflows.