In our 1983 paper we offered evidence that the law of demand operates inside the Federal Reserve. In particular, the Fed faces a requirement that it return all revenues in excess of operating expenses to the Treasury, and this constraint lowers the price of amenities in terms of foregone profits. The monetary authority accordingly buys more of the wage and nonwage perquisites of office than otherwise. Because we treated amenities as a monotone transformation of Federal Reserve System employment, our theory suggested that the Fed would pad its operating expenses by increasing the number of employees on its payroll. Moreover, given that expansionary open market operations raise the interest income earned by the Fed on its securities portfolio, bureaucratic incentives would impart an inflationary bias to monetary policy. In subsequent tests of the theory, we found a positive and significant ceteris paribus relationship between changes in the monetary base and the size of the Fed. This result suggested that one motivation for expansions in the money supply is to finance the growth in the Fed's bureaucracy. We also found evidence that employment causes money in the sense of Christopher Sims (1972), but not the reverse, and that the growth in Fed employment over time does not appear to have been due to the fact that more people are required to manage larger money stocks. In their comments, John Boyd and John Strong suggest that there are methodological and empirical problems with our paper. Both comments focus primarily on the, causality tests, but each raises other issues designed to cast doubt on the strength of our results. In what follows, we discuss the main points raised by our critics. I. Causality

Because the main objectives of the Federal Reserve System (the Fed) concern what Milton Friedman (chapter 2, p. 12) describes as the Holy Trinity — full employment, economic growth, and stable prices — scholarly evaluations of the central bank’s performance understandably center most often on the behavior over time of macroeconomic variables such as the aggregate price level, interest rates, and national income. Recently, however, Friedman and others have been drawn to the view that an explanation for the Fed’s monetary policy record may be found in the bureaucratic incentives faced by central bank officials.

In the analysis of the costs of monopoly power, the usual experiment is to convert a competitive industry into a monopoly and observe the consequent change in consumer's surplus. Modern contributions have emphasized the deadweight cost of monopoly (Arnold Harberger, 1954) and the possibility of an associated rent-seeking cost of monopoly (Gordon Tullock, 1967). The Harberger cost, of course, refers to the lost consumer's surplus triangle; the Tullock cost concerns the role of competition for monopoly returns. Taken together and assuming that the competition for monopoly rents is perfect, the total cost of monopoly power is a trapezoid, the rectangle of monopoly profits plus the triangle of lost consumer's surplus (Richard Posner, 1975). In this paper we approach the monopoly problem in a different spirit. We compare three states of the world-competition, regulation, and deregulation. In this setting we ask, what happens if a monopoly is eliminated through deregulation? Our analysis suggests that because under most conditions Tullock costs cannot be recouped, the returns to deregulation are lower than previously thought. Rent-seeking expenditures in the past leave the economy permanently poorer even if competition is restored to the industry. In contrast, the returns to preventing monopoly in the first place are relatively high in our model. An insight afforded by the analysis is an explanation of the persistence of laws and regulations which appear to serve no interest. In this regard the example of railroad regulation in the United States comes to mind. The standard explanation for such regulation is either that voters and government decision makers are ignorant of basic economics or that a small interest group like railroad firms wins rents at the expense of uninformed or economically rational consumers of rail services who do not find it cost effective to seek deregulation. We offer another and perhaps more plausible explanation for the persistence of regulation and the apathy of consumers about the costs of regulation. Namely, the costs of such regulations are, for the most part, the original rent-seeking expenditures that lead to the regulation in the first place, and these costs are sunk. Abolishing so-called uneconomic laws does nothing to recover these losses. Hence, there is little political support from any quarter to return to the status quo ante. In fact, as we shall show, such a deregulatory program can easily impose more costs than it is worth. There are numerous examples of this point, including tariffs and quotas of all sorts, subsidies to farmers, the postal monopoly, organized labor's antitrust exemption, the licensing of doctors, and so forth. The traditional explanations of these monopoly rights, namely ignorance of economic common sense and special-interest groups, are neither sufficient nor necessary. Since the primary costs of these laws are rent-seeking expenditures which are made prior to their passage, there is simply little to be gained by changing them now. Gains would accrue in the form of reduced Harberger costs; costs would be borne in passing and implementing the deregulatory program. It is not that the potential gainers from deregulation are large in number, diffuse, heterogeneous, and face high organizational costs, rather, they do not exist to any degree. Interpreted in this light, efforts by political action groups, such as the Right-to-Work Foundation, stand to be a drain on society's resources. They cannot produce anything unless they prevent further monopolization through regulation. We do not, of course, *McCormick and Shughart: Clemson University, Clemson, SC 29631; Tollison: Center for the Study of Public Choice, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA 22030. Thanks go to James Buchanan, Rex Cottle, and Gordon Tullock for helpful comments. The usual caveat applies.

Our paper in this Review (1984) aroused a controversy we did not anticipate, but no one has yet convinced us that our basic point is wrong. Joe Bell (1988, p. 282) now makes the assertion that our conclusion rests entirely upon unexplained asymmetries in mobility. This seems to us a very curious assertion indeed. The main problem with Bell's analysis is that he treats investment in capital assets as perfectly malleable. A lawyer trained to argue rate cases is not perfectly suited for other jobs when electric utility deregulation occurs. The time and effort spent by the lawyer to acquire the requisite skills are irretrievably lost. This is the point of our paper. Even though future labor can be supplied by this lawyer after deregulation, it definitionally has a lower value. Lawyering before a regulatory commission is a specialized input. When the demand for these services falls, the capital value of the intensive and extensive investments vanish. No asymmetry is implied or required. More generally, capital consumed in using the political process to secure a wealth transfer-the resources devoted to organizing coalitions, investing in lobbying activities, contributing to political campaigns, advertising a point of view, acquiring the stock of human capital necessary for dealing with regulatory bureaucracies, and so onreduces the wealth of society in opportunitycost terms. For the reasons just stated, the cost of obtaining additional output in the regulated industry following deregulation is higher. We also pointed out that the increase in marginal costs due to what Bell calls resource immobility may only be a short-term phenomenon: Over time, resources in the [deregulated] industry will adapt to the new competitive environment, and new resources coming into the industry will embody the r quisite skills for working in a competitive rather than a government-sponsored sector. Thus, after the relevant adjustment period, marginal costs in the deregulated sector may decline, but it is simply wrong to suppose that deregulation enables the capital value of resources specializing in rent-seeking activities to be used again in the production of goods. Anyway, in present-value terms it does not take very long for this adjustment process to impose significant costs on the economy. This point is covered in fn. 7 in our original paper.

This paper treats racial integration as an innovation in economic process in which economic entities find it advantageous to utilize potentially more productive inputs previously unavailable due to law, custom, or managerial discretion. Data on the racial integration of Major League Baseball and Atlantic Coast Conference basketball are employed to address this issue. The central question examined is which type of team integrated first—losers or winners? The results strongly support the idea that entrepreneurship trumps competitive rivalry; that is, winning teams led the process of racial integration.

In representative democracies, such as the United States, legislatures provide the transmission mechanism through which pressure from private interests becomes public policy. Considerable attention has been given in the literature to explanations of the relevant forces that appear to be driving the legislative process. For example, much research has focused on the relative impact of economic vs. ideological influences on congressional voting behavior. In this approach, the way that legislators vote on proposed legislation is modeled as a function of the preferences of various economic and ideological interests groups, including the legislator's own preferences for wealth and ideology (James Kau and Paul Rubin, 1979; Joseph Kalt and Mark Zupan, 1984; Sam Peltzman, 1985). Missing from this approach is the idea that when legislatures are the transmission mechanism, they are costly and imperfect organizations for generating political influence (Gary Becker, 1983). As such, rules and institutions will emerge that are related to problems of internal control within the organization of a legislature. In this paper, we focus on the role of floor voting from the standpoint of legislator organization and control. We seek to expand the interpretation of the meaning of floor voting activity by examining the timing, sequence, and outcomes of such votes. Specifically, we look at final floor voting in the U.S. Congress. The patterns described in the analysis below suggest that a broader analytical perspective on the economic function of floor voting is required. The findings also suggest that to identify more precisely the forces that are driving legislator voting behavior, it is important to recognize the role of legislative transactional costs and institutional constraints. In Section I, the conceptual framework for the empirical results is discussed in more detail. The purpose is not to develop a fullblown theory of legislative organization, rather, it is to focus the reader's attention on several hypotheses about the function of final floor voting as a device for controlling legislator behavior within the legislature. Empirical results, including an explanation of the timing and sequence of final votes on bills, are reported in Section II. The data for these tests are drawn from legislative activities in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 96th and 98th Congresses. Some concluding remarks are offered in Section III.

The question of whether controls on the importation of foreign oil into the United States should take the form of tariffs or quotas has been a topic of recent public debate and investigation bv econonmists. Under static competitive conditions it is well known that equivalent tariffs and quotas can be constrtucted. Hence in this context, there is no choice to be mlade on economic efficiency grounds.' Hlowever, in a recent isstue of this Review, George Hay poinlts out that the actual market for oil in the United States differs fromii the required textbook conditions for equivalence. Under the U.S. oil import program which prevailed until recentl-, each refiner's quota for inmport of foreign oil is a positive function of his refinery input. Since import tickets are allocated free of charge, rather than auctioned, the form of the quota lowers the marginal cost of domestic refiners. Hay goes on to show that when combined with other static competitive assumptions, this quota mechanismi could generate greater consumer benefits in terms of lower prices than would an equivalent tariff (equivalent in the sense that the same percentage of imports is admitted).2 Hay expresses a preference for tariffs in a real world context and warns that his analysis of the price effects of the U.S. oil quota system holds only under very restrictive conditions. However, he does not address what is perhaps an even more important deviation of the domestic oil industry from the standard textbook model: crude oil production in the United States was limited in the major producing states by regulatory commissions that practiced market demand prorationing under the old oil quota program. Under this system, an-y price set by the industry is ratified by the commissions by limiting production to a level that will not result in the accumulation of undesired inventories.' We are not addressing the issue of the level of price in the oil industry in this paper. Rather, we wish to review the effects of tariffs and quotas on resource allocation, an issue which Hay omits from his analysis; and, for this purpose we make use of the simple model of a profit-maximizing monopolv as a characterization of the domestic oil industry. The assumption of profit maximiza-