With a focus on two sorts of regulation—renewable electricity and clean energy standards, and automobile fuel-economy standards—we analyze problematic interactions that arise when state policies are nested within the domain of Federal policy. Here state efforts may fail to reduce greenhouse gas emissions nationally, and may compromise cost-effectiveness. Difficulties from overlapping regulations are avoidable through price- (as opposed to quantity-) based Federal policy. We identify some potentially positive interactions between state and Federal policies, and identify rationales for state action when Federal and state policies do not overlap.

This paper analyzes 19th and 20th century data from a well-known château in Bordeaux. The dataset includes information on weather conditions, starting dates of three phenological stages of grapevine, prices, and yields. We discuss how these variables have evolved over the last two centuries. We also study to what extent the impact of climate on yields and prices has changed over time. Our regression analysis suggests that the effect of temperature on yields has become weaker since the 19th century. The influence on prices has, on the contrary, become stronger.

Most analyses treat global warning as a single-agent problem. The present study presents the Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) model. By disaggregating into countries, the model analyzes different national strategies in climate-change policy: pure market solutions, efficient cooperative outcomes, and noncooperative equilibria. This study finds that cooperative policies show much higher levels of emissions reductions than do noncooperative strategies; that there are substantial differences in the levels of controls in both the cooperative and the noncooperative policies among different countries; and that high-income countries may be the major losers from cooperation.

We review the proposed measures for addressing competitiveness and carbon leakage concerns in recent US climate policy legislation. For eligible energy-intensive, trade-exposed sectors, output-based rebates would initially dampen cost increases; later, border adjustments would ensure that imports face comparable cost burdens. Both measures can in theory enhance the economic efficiency of carbon reduction efforts, but both pose some interesting economic and practical trade-offs. This paper discusses our recent research into the welfare and carbon leakage effects of using output-based allocation and trade measures in conjunction with climate policies.

Most analyses treat global warming as a single-agent problem. The present study presents the Regional Integrated model of Climate and the Economy (RICE) model. By disaggregating into countries, the model analyzes different national strategies in climate-change policy: pure market solutions, efficient cooperative outcomes, and noncooperative equilibria. This study finds that cooperative policies show much higher levels of emissions reductions than do noncooperative strategies; that there are substantial differences in the levels of controls in both the cooperative and the noncooperative policies among different countries; and that high-income countries may be the major losers from cooperation.

Common views hold that the efficient way to limit warming to a chosen level is to price carbon emissions at a rate that increases exponentially. We show that this Hotelling tax on carbon emissions is actually inefficient. The least-cost policy path takes advantage of the climate system's inertia to delay reducing emissions and allow greater cumulative emissions. The efficient carbon tax follows an inverse-U-shaped path and grows more slowly than the Hotelling tax. Economic models that assume exponentially increasing carbon taxes are overestimating the cost of limiting warming, overestimating the efficient near-term carbon tax, and overvaluing technologies that mature sooner.

Lemoine and Rudik (2017) argues that it is efficient to delay reducing carbon emissions, due to supposed inertia in the climate system’s response to emissions. This conclusion rests upon misunderstanding the relevant earth system modeling: there is no substantial lag between CO 2 emissions and warming. Applying a representation of the earth system that captures the range of responses seen in complex earth system models invalidates the original article’s implications for climate policy. The least-cost policy path that limits warming to 2°C implies that the carbon price starts high and increases at the interest rate. It cannot rely on climate inertia to delay reducing and allow greater cumulative emissions.

Mattauch et al. (2020) claims that the quantitative conclusions in Lemoine and Rudik (2017)—henceforth, LR17—are not robust to using a climate model consistent with recent scientific results. We observe that LR17 in fact analyzes an extension to a more realistic carbon model that generates an efficient emission tax trajectory very similar to that in Mattauch et al. (2020), and we here show that simplifications in the temperature model of LR17 do not qualitatively affect their policy conclusions. Accounting for inertia reduces the initial emission tax by 42 percent and reduces the present value of abatement cost by 39 percent.

Katharine Coman's “Some Unsettled Problems of Irrigation,” published in March 1911 in the first issue of the American Economic Review, addressed issues of water supply, rights, and organization. These same issues have relevance today, in the face of growing concern about the availability of fresh water worldwide. The central point of this article is that appropriative water rights and irrigation districts that emerged in the American West in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in response to aridity to facilitate agricultural water delivery, use, and trade raise the transaction costs today of water markets. These markets are vital for smooth reallocation of water to higher-valued uses elsewhere in the economy and for flexible response to greater hydrological uncertainty. This institutional path dependence illustrates how past arrangements to meet conditions of the time constrain contemporary economic opportunities. They cannot be easily significantly modified or replaced ex post.

This paper reports the results of an evaluation of partial-equilibrium welfare measures of the effects of large multisector shocks to an economic system. A nine a developed economy was used in the analysis. The findings indicate that the errors in single-sector, partial-equilibrium welfare measures depend on the consistency in the signs and approximate magnitude of indirect price effects. Disparities in either the direction or size of price changes in the indirectly affected markets can lead to large errors in the partial-equilibrium welfare measures.