Few if any issues in public policy are as muddled and contentious as international migration. There is no international regime that establishes standards and principles for national migration policies other than in the case of refugees (migrants escaping persecution). My aim here is to describe some economic and ethical principles that may underpin an international migration regime.

Geography and social links shape economic interactions. In industries, schools, and markets, the entire network determines outcomes. This paper analyzes a large class of games and obtains a striking result. Equilibria depend on a single network measure: the lowest eigenvalue. This paper is the first to uncover the importance of the lowest eigenvalue to economic and social outcomes. It captures how much the network amplifies agents' actions. The paper combines new tools—potential games, optimization, and spectral graph theory—to solve for all Nash and stable equilibria and applies the results to R&D, crime, and the econometrics of peer effects.

The US population will age rapidly for several decades and then more slowly, with less aging than most rich nations. Health of the elderly has greatly improved, but disability stagnated after 2000. Retirement age reversed its decline in the mid-1990s and health status leaves ample room for increased elder labor supply. Many older people have inadequate retirement savings and face additional risks including uncertainty about both public and private pensions and health insurance. Population aging may cause a small decline in rates of return. The main problem is the impact of population aging on public programs for the elderly.

A model of public and private liquidity integrates financial intermediation theory with a New Monetarist monetary framework. Non-passive fiscal policy and costs of operating a currency system imply that an optimal policy deviates from the Friedman rule. A liquidity trap can exist in equilibrium away from the Friedman rule, and there exists a permanent nonneutrality of money, driven by an illiquidity effect. Financial frictions can produce a financial-crisis phenomenon that can be mitigated by conventional open market operations working in an unconventional manner. Private asset purchases by the central bank are either irrelevant or they reallocate credit and redistribute income.

This paper considers three challenge areas for mechanism design and describes the role approximation plays in resolving them. Challenge 1: optimal mechanisms are finely tuned to precise details of the distribution on agent preferences. Challenge 2: in environments with multi-dimensional agent preferences economic analysis has failed to provide general characterizations optimal mechanisms. Challenge 3: optimal mechanisms are parameterized by unrealistic knowledge of the distribution of agents' private preferences. This paper surveys positive resolutions to these challenges with emphasis on basic techniques and their relevance to theory and practice.

The current members of the Committee on Economic Statistics are Matthew Shapiro, University of Michigan (Chair); Mark Bils, University of Rochester; Dennis Fixler, Bureau of Economic Analysis; Barbara Fraumeni, University of Southern Maine; David Johnson, Census Bureau; Randall Kroszner, University of Chicago; Jonathan Parker, Northwestern University; Charles Schultze, Brookings Institution; and Jack Triplett. In January 2007, the Executive Committee voted to give the Committee standing authority to organize three sessions each year for inclusion on the program of the Association’s annual meeting. At its April 2008 meeting, the Executive Committee voted to allow the Committee to designate one session each year for publication in the annual Papers and Proceedings volume. For the January 2011 meeting, the Committee circulated a call for papers related to the statistical issues arising from the financial crisis and potential changes in financial regulations, markets, and institutions in addition to any topics related to economic statistics. The following three sessions are included in the program of the January 2010 meeting: “Frontiers of Productivity and Output Measurement,” “New Approaches to Measuring Household-Level Finances,” and “Measuring Financial Capacity and Risk: Lessons from the Financial Crisis.” Details of the sessions are given in the Table. The Committee has also undertaken the task of commissioning reviews of needs for data in particular subject matter areas. A group cochaired by Robert Feenstra and Robert Lipsey completed a report on data needs for research on international trade. It was discussed at this year’s National Bureau of Economic Research Summer Institute meetings. It is scheduled for discussion at a meeting of the Federal Economic American Economic Association Committee on Statistics (AEAStat)

The current members of the Committee on Economic Statistics are Matthew Shapiro, University of Michigan (chair); Katharine Abraham, University of Maryland; Robert Feenstra, University of California–Davis; Dennis Fixler, Bureau of Economic Analysis; David Johnson, Census Bureau; Barbara Fraumeni, University of Southern Maine; Jonathan Parker, Northwestern University; Charles Schultze, Brookings Institution; Jack Triplett. The committee met by teleconference in January and September 2009. Katharine Abraham stepped down as chair of the Committee on Statistics early in 2009 in order to chair the newly established American Economic Association Committee on Government Relations. The Committee on Statistics is exceedingly grateful for her thoughtful and effective leadership during her tenure as chair. In January 2007, the Executive Committee voted to give the Committee standing authority to organize three sessions each year for inclusion on the program of the Association’s annual meeting. At its April 2008 meeting, the Executive Committee voted to allow the Committee to designate one session each year for publication in the annual Papers and Proceedings volume. For the January 2010 meeting, the Committee circulated a call for papers on the measurement of intangibles, trade in services, and other economic measurement topics. The following three sessions are included in the program of the January 2010 meeting: “Measuring Intangible Capital,” “Measuring Labor and Wage Dynamics with Administrative Data,” and “Measuring Cognition and Linking it to Economic Outcomes.” Details of the sessions are given in the Table. The call for papers for the 2011 session solicits submissions related to the statistical issues arising from the financial crisis and potential changes in financial regulations, markets, and institutions in addition to any topics related to economic statistics. American Economic Association Committee on Statistics (AEAStat)

Blonigen and Haynes (2002) calculated that pass-through of antidumping duty estimates to U.S. pricing of 200% would be required to eliminate potential antidumping duties. However, this calculation was based on an error in interpretation of U.S. antidumping practice, that antidumping duties themselves are subtracted in an antidumping calculation. In fact there is no such subtraction, and a pass-through of 100% theoretically suffices to eliminate potential antidumping duties

Consumers may overestimate the precision of their demand forecasts. This overconfidence creates an incentive for both monopolists and competitive firms to offer tariffs with included quantities at zero marginal cost, followed by steep marginal charges. This matches observed cellular phone service pricing plans in the United States and elsewhere. An alternative explanation with common priors can be ruled out in favor of overconfidence based on observed customer usage patterns for a major US cellular phone service provider. The model can be reinterpreted to explain the use of flat rates and late fees in rental markets, and teaser rates on loans. Nevertheless, firms may benefit from consumers losing their overconfidence.

The existing literature typically does not differentiate between security returns and the returns of investors in these securities. This study clarifies that investor and security returns differ because of the timing and magnitude of investor capital flows into and out of these securities. The empirical results indicate that actual investor returns are systematically lower than buy-and-hold returns for nearly all major international stock markets. These results imply that the historical equity premium and the cost of equity capital are likely lower than previously thought.