Massive Online Open Courses (MOOCs) present the potential to deliver high quality education to a large number of students. But they suffer from low completion rates. This paper identifies disorganization as a factor behind failure to complete a MOOC. Students who enroll one day late are 17 percentage points less likely to earn a certificate than students who enroll exactly on time. This reflects selection, but it does seem to be related to demographic characteristics, motivation to complete the course, or ability. This suggests that building in even more structure in the MOOC could be a factor in improving performance.

Trade and export, it is argued, spur economic growth. This paper studies the microeconomics of exporting. We build a heuristic model of transactions between exporters and producers and relate it to East India Company (EIC) operations in colonial Bengal. Our model and the historical record stress two difficulties: the exporter and its agents might not uphold payment agreements, and producers might not honor sales contracts. The model shows when procurement succeeds or fails, highlighting the tension between these two hold-up problems. We analyze several cases, including the EIC's cotton textile venture, the famous Opium Monopoly, and present-day contract farming.

January 2003

A common view is that bailouts of firms by governments are needed to cure inefficiencies in private markets. We propose an alternative view: even when private markets are efficient, costly bankruptcies will occur and benevolent governments without commitment will bail out firms to avoid bankruptcy costs. Bailouts then introduce inefficiencies where none had existed. Although granting the government orderly resolution powers which allow it to rewrite private contracts improves on bailout outcomes, regulating leverage and taxing size is needed to achieve the relevant constrained efficient outcome, the sustainably efficient outcome. This outcome respects governments' incentives to intervene when they lack commitment.

tinational corporation in the arena of economic activity and political influence, trade theorists have either ignored it or expressed unguarded skepticism at the ability of the conventional trade models to successfully capture and analyze the features of this new phenomenon.' The purpose of this paper is twofold: first, by building upon the contribution by Richard Caves, we will show that the traditional trade models can be adapted in a way that preserves most, if not all, of the attributes introduced by international firms.2 Second, we will conduct a comparative statics analysis to explore the implications of tariffs and taxes for resource allocation and international capital movements. Our results here confirm what has already been well established in myriad empirical studies, that maturation of the international firm has vastly increased economic interdependence among trading countries, and that few nations can eschew the ripples caused by economic policies of other nations.3

We present a model of policy development in which competing factions have different ideologies, yet agree on certain common objectives. Policy developers can appeal to a decision maker by making productive investments to improve the quality of their proposals. These investments are specific to a given proposal, which means that policy developers can potentially obtain informal agenda power. Competition undermines this agenda power, forcing policy developers to craft policies that are better for the decision maker. This beneficial effect is strongest if policy developers have divergent ideological preferences, because their intense desire to affect policy motivates them to develop higher quality proposals.