Using linked employer-employee data from Brazil, we document a significant gender pay gap, which is largely attributed to women working at lower-paying employers. To interpret this fact, we develop an equilibrium search model with endogenous firm pay, amenities, and hiring. We provide a constructive proof of identification of all model parameters. The estimated model suggests that amenities are important for both men and women, and that compensating differentials account for half of the gender pay gap. Equal treatment policies partly close gender gaps but are not output- or welfare-improving

We construct a public atlas of mean outcomes in adulthood by childhood census tract. Outcomes vary sharply across neighborhoods: For children whose parents earn $27,000, the standard deviation of mean household income in adulthood is $10,420 across tracts within counties. Only half the variation in outcomes is explained by traditional measures of neighborhood opportunity like poverty rates. Experimental and quasi-experimental estimates indicate 60 percent of the variation in outcomes across neighborhoods is driven by causal effects. We demonstrate how our statistics can be applied to better target policies to improve low-opportunity areas and help families move to affordable high-opportunity areas.

This paper examines the effects of privatizing social health insurance in the United States. We study this question in the context of the Medicaid program, the largest health insurer in the US and the largest means-tested program in the nation -serving over 90 million low-income families and individuals with disabilities. Exploiting a natural experiment wherein nearly 100,000 Medicaid enrollees were randomly assigned between a state-administered fee-for-service system and private managed care, we find that spending was nearly 10% lower for enrollees assigned to managed care plans. These savings were concentrated in prescription drugs, where we show that prior authorization was the key mechanism plans used to reduce overuse and encourage substitution to lower-cost alternatives without reducing quality. This was distinct from the effects of privatization on medical benefits, where private plans lowered quality and abraded consumers without achieving savings. In contrast to what our findings imply for an efficient public-private division of services, Medicaid has historically favored the public provision of prescription drugs and private outsourcing of medical care

We develop a leverage theory of tying in markets with network effects. When a monopolist in one market cannot perfectly extract surplus from consumers, tying can be a mechanism through which unexploited consumer surplus is used as a demand-side leverage to create a “quasi-installed base” advantage in another market characterized by network effects. Our mechanism does not require any precommitment to tying; rather, tying emerges as a best response that lowers the quality of tied-market rivals. While tying can lead to exclusion of tied-market rivals, it can also expand use of the tying product, leading to ambiguous welfare effects.

Using new methods, we measure the intensities of higher-order risk preferences (prudence and temperance) in an incentivized experiment with 658 adolescents. Aligned with theory, we find that higher-order risk preferences are strongly related to field behavior, including prevention, health, addictive behavior, and financial decision-making. Most importantly, we show that ignoring prudence and temperance can yield misleading conclusions about the relation of risk preferences to field behavior, and that survey measures of risk tolerance often relate to field behavior because they capture higher-order risk preferences.

The implementation of evidence-based policies hinges on the dissemination of evidence to policymakers, a process influenced by the attributes of the sender. We conduct a country-wide RCT in which two ideologically opposite prominent think tanks, two major newspapers, and a research institution with nonsalient ideology communicate identical information about a low-cost, non-ideological, and effective policy based on published research findings to a large sample of Spanish local policymakers. We measure the impact of information directly on policy adoption and find heterogeneous effects. When the informing institution aligns ideologically with policymakers, communicating research results leads to a more than 65% increase in policy adoption compared to an uninformed control group, while informing from an opposite ideology does not lead to policy adoption. Our design also allows us to compare the impact of knowledge brokers, such as think tanks, and coverage in leading newspapers in adopting public policies. We find that, when ideologically aligned with policymakers, both are equally effective in increasing policy adoption. We propose a three-stage conceptual framework of policy adoption processes - selective exposure to information, belief updating, and policy implementation- and show that ideological alignment does not influence selective exposure to information. However, evidence from a post-intervention online experiment shows that ideological alignment affects belief updating regarding a recommended policy's effectiveness. Finally, we discuss the trade-offs between effectiveness and outreach when using ideologically aligned and nonsalient institutions to disseminate research evidence and comment on the economic impact of ideological alignment for policy implementation.

We introduce an empirical framework for valuing markets in environmental offsets. Using newly-collected data on wetland conservation and offsets, we apply this framework to evaluate a set of decentralized markets in Florida, where land developers purchase offsets from long-lived producers who restore wetlands over time. We find that offsets led to substantial private gains from trade, creating $2.4 billion of net surplus from 1995–2020 relative to direct conservation. Offset trading also generated new hydrological externalities. A locally differentiated Pigouvian tax would have prevented $1.6 billion of new flood damage while preserving more than two-thirds of the private gains from trade.

We assess whether men and women are treated differently when presenting their economics research. We collected data across thousands of seminars, job market talks, and conference presentations, leveraging human judgment and audio-processing algorithms to measure the number, tone, and type of interruptions. Within a seminar series, women are interrupted more than men. This holds when controlling for characteristics of the presenter, paper, and audience. Interruptions that are negative in tenor or tone or cut off the presenter mid-sentence increase for women presenters. We also find greater engagement of female audience members with female presenters, suggesting a potential role model effect

Do elite colleges help talented students join the social elite or help incumbent elites retain their positions? We combine intergenerationally linked data from Chile with a regression discontinuity design to show that, looking across generations, elite colleges do both. Lower-status individuals who gain admission to elite college programs transform their children’s social environment. Children become more likely to attend high-status private schools and colleges and to live near and befriend high-status peers. In contrast, academic achievement is unaffected. Simulations combining descriptive and quasi-experimental findings show that elite colleges tighten the link between social and human capital while decreasing intergenerational social mobility.

This paper studies the efficiency of self-enforced relational agreements, a common solution to contracting frictions, when sellers have market power and contracts cannot be externally enforced. To this end, I develop a dynamic contracting model with limited enforcement in which buyers can default on their trade credit debt and estimate it using a novel dataset from the Ecuadorian manufacturing supply chain. The key empirical finding is that bilateral trade is inefficiently low in early periods of the relationship, but converges toward efficiency over time, despite sellers’ market power. Counterfactual simulations imply that both market power and enforcement contribute to inefficiencies in trade