How did it become possible to exchange apparently valueless pieces of paper for goods? This paper provides an equilibrium account of the transition between barter and fiat-money regimes. The explanation relies on the intervention of a self-interested government which must be able to promise credibly to limit the issue of money. To achieve credibility, the government must offset the benefits of seigniorage by internalizing some of the macroeconomic externalities generated by the issue of fiat money. The government's patience and the extent of its involvement in the economy are key determinants of whether the transition can be accomplished.

The small representation of women and minorities among students of economics has been noted for some time. While the proportion of B.A.'s earned by women in psychology rose from 36.7 percent in 1949-1950 to 70.8 percent in 1988-1989, in sociology from 50.6 percent to 68.8 percent, and even in mathematics from 22.6 percent to 46.0 percent, in economics it has increased from only 7.6 percent to 32.5 percent. The share of Ph.D.'s earned by women in 1988-1989 was 56.2 percent in psychology, 50.9 percent in sociology, 26.6 percent in business, 19.4 percent in mathematics, and 19.0 percent in economics. Hence, general sexism in the classroom1 does not appear to be the main culprit, nor do the explanations that mathematics requirements inhibit women's entry into economics or that women are uninterested in business-related fields seem convincing. Instead, one must look to factors specific to economics. Evidence that women students do not perform as well as men in introductory economics courses (John J. Siegfried, 1979; Gordon Anderson, et al., 1994), although they have higher grades overall, further adds to this conclusion. For these reasons there has been considerable interest among feminist economists in the chilly classroom climate, for women and minority students in economics courses. In this paper, the focus is on the small representation of women among economics faculties, the biased subject matter, and the narrow approach of traditional economics. The number of women faculty can only be increased gradually as their representation among graduate students and new faculty hires increases. However, the subject matter can be changed more rapidly, as the consciousness of instructors and authors of textbooks is raised, and the challenge to the traditional economic approach appears to be making more progress than most of us dared to hope only a few short years ago. Thus, in spite of the remaining problems, there is reason to believe that in economics, as in most other disciplines, women's progress will eventually accelerate.

This paper establishes an empirical link between firm capital structure and product-market competition using data from local supermarket competition. First, an event-study analysis of supermarket leveraged buyouts (LBO's) suggests that an LBO announcement increases the market value of the LBO chain's local rivals. Second, I show that supermarket chains were more likely to enter and expand in a local market if a large share of the incumbent firms in the local market undertook LBO's. The study suggests that leverage increases in the late 1980's led to softer product-market competition in this industry.

This paper presents empirical evidence against the standard dichotomy in macroeconomics that separates growth from the volatility of economic fluctuations. In a sample of 92 countries as well as a sample of OECD countries, we find that countries with higher volatility have lower growth. The addition of standard control variables strengthens the negative relationship. We also find that government spending-induced volatility is negatively associated with growth even after controlling for both time- and country-fixed effects.

This paper establishes an empirical link between firm capital structure and product-market competition using data from local supermarket competition. First, an event-study analysis of supermarket leveraged buyouts (LBOs) suggests that a LBO announcement increases the market value of the LBO chain's local rivals. Second, the author shows that supermarket chains were more likely to enter and expand in a local market if a large share of the incumbent firms in the local market undertook LBOs. The study suggests that leverage increases in the late 1980s led to softer product-market competition in this industry.

During business-cycle expansions, wages appear to rise relative to output prices.1 This fact is easy to square with real-business-cycle models which are based on the assumption that labor is more productive during expansions. But it is inconsistent with standard business-cycle theories based on aggregate demand fluctuations. In these models, fixed technology and diminishing returns imply that labor becomes less productive as output rises. Thus, in an expansion, wages should fall relative to output prices. Julio Rotemberg and Michael Woodford (1991, 1992) argue that imperfect competition can help to reconcile aggregatedemand theories of business cycles with observed procyclical real wages. If firms compete more aggressively during expansions, reducing the markup of price over marginal cost, the real wage can be driven up even if labor's marginal product falls. Countercyclical markups can therefore induce procyclical real wages. The difficult issue is understanding why markups would be countercyclical. Rotemberg and Garth Saloner (1986) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1991, 1992)hereafter referred to as RSW-claim that markups are countercyclical because it is harder for oligopolistic firms to sustain collusive prices during booms. When current demand is high relative to future demand, the incentive for any firm to cut its price rises because it becomes more valuable to capture current sales than to maintain collusion in the future. RSW present evidence that markups are indeed more countercyclical in more concentrated industries (where collusion can be more easily sustained). While this finding is consistent with countercyclical collusion, it is also consistent with any other theory in which imperfect competition induces firms to compete more aggressively during booms. In this paper, we analyze an alternative theory of countercyclical markups based on imperfect competition and capital-market imperfections. This theory has been suggested by Bruce Greenwald et al. (1984), Nils Gottfries (1991), and Paul Klemperer (1993). We present some preliminary evidence in an effort to distinguish this explanation from countercyclical collusion.