The concept of an American underclass has become the subject of increasing discussion. Although the term does not enjoy a precise definition, most researchers acknowledge that the underclass condition involves more than being cash poor. Members of the underclass are also believed to have attitudinal and behavioral deficiencies. Other terms that have been used to describe this group over the years include: dangerous classes, other Americans, culture of poverty, and lower classes (see Ken Auletta, 1981). Within this area of inquiry, several researchers have chosen to study what has been termed the black underclass. The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, the appropriateness of the data that are used to characterize members of the black underclass will be examined. Second, the argument that perhaps the most viable solution to the problems of the black underclass are community self-help programs, rather than government programs, will be discussed.

In representative democracies, such as the United States, legislatures provide the transmission mechanism through which pressure from private interests becomes public policy. Considerable attention has been given in the literature to explanations of the relevant forces that appear to be driving the legislative process. For example, much research has focused on the relative impact of economic vs. ideological influences on congressional voting behavior. In this approach, the way that legislators vote on proposed legislation is modeled as a function of the preferences of various economic and ideological interests groups, including the legislator's own preferences for wealth and ideology (James Kau and Paul Rubin, 1979; Joseph Kalt and Mark Zupan, 1984; Sam Peltzman, 1985). Missing from this approach is the idea that when legislatures are the transmission mechanism, they are costly and imperfect organizations for generating political influence (Gary Becker, 1983). As such, rules and institutions will emerge that are related to problems of internal control within the organization of a legislature. In this paper, we focus on the role of floor voting from the standpoint of legislator organization and control. We seek to expand the interpretation of the meaning of floor voting activity by examining the timing, sequence, and outcomes of such votes. Specifically, we look at final floor voting in the U.S. Congress. The patterns described in the analysis below suggest that a broader analytical perspective on the economic function of floor voting is required. The findings also suggest that to identify more precisely the forces that are driving legislator voting behavior, it is important to recognize the role of legislative transactional costs and institutional constraints. In Section I, the conceptual framework for the empirical results is discussed in more detail. The purpose is not to develop a fullblown theory of legislative organization, rather, it is to focus the reader's attention on several hypotheses about the function of final floor voting as a device for controlling legislator behavior within the legislature. Empirical results, including an explanation of the timing and sequence of final votes on bills, are reported in Section II. The data for these tests are drawn from legislative activities in the U.S. House of Representatives during the 96th and 98th Congresses. Some concluding remarks are offered in Section III.

Our paper in this Review (1984) aroused a controversy we did not anticipate, but no one has yet convinced us that our basic point is wrong. Joe Bell (1988, p. 282) now makes the assertion that our conclusion rests entirely upon unexplained asymmetries in mobility. This seems to us a very curious assertion indeed. The main problem with Bell's analysis is that he treats investment in capital assets as perfectly malleable. A lawyer trained to argue rate cases is not perfectly suited for other jobs when electric utility deregulation occurs. The time and effort spent by the lawyer to acquire the requisite skills are irretrievably lost. This is the point of our paper. Even though future labor can be supplied by this lawyer after deregulation, it definitionally has a lower value. Lawyering before a regulatory commission is a specialized input. When the demand for these services falls, the capital value of the intensive and extensive investments vanish. No asymmetry is implied or required. More generally, capital consumed in using the political process to secure a wealth transfer-the resources devoted to organizing coalitions, investing in lobbying activities, contributing to political campaigns, advertising a point of view, acquiring the stock of human capital necessary for dealing with regulatory bureaucracies, and so onreduces the wealth of society in opportunitycost terms. For the reasons just stated, the cost of obtaining additional output in the regulated industry following deregulation is higher. We also pointed out that the increase in marginal costs due to what Bell calls resource immobility may only be a short-term phenomenon: Over time, resources in the [deregulated] industry will adapt to the new competitive environment, and new resources coming into the industry will embody the r quisite skills for working in a competitive rather than a government-sponsored sector. Thus, after the relevant adjustment period, marginal costs in the deregulated sector may decline, but it is simply wrong to suppose that deregulation enables the capital value of resources specializing in rent-seeking activities to be used again in the production of goods. Anyway, in present-value terms it does not take very long for this adjustment process to impose significant costs on the economy. This point is covered in fn. 7 in our original paper.