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Information and intergroup transfers
Cash versus Kind, Self-Selection, and Efficient Transfers
[This paper investigates second-best (transfers in kind) and third-best (subsidies and taxes) Pareto optima in a simple model where government lacks full information about consumer types (who is able, who is infirm). These Pareto optima rely on self-selection. We show that every third-best optimum other than the equal-income Walrasian equilibrium is Pareto-dominated by a second-best optimum and that standard "willingness-to-pay" criteria are inappropriate in this environment.]
Cash versus Kind, Self-selection, and Efficient Transfers
This paper investigates second-best (transfers in kind) and third-best (subsidies and taxes) Pare to optima in a simple model were government lacks full information ab out consumer types (who is able, who is infirm). These Pareto optima rely on self-selection. The authors show that those second-best Paret o optima which are not also first-best (some do exist) can only be su pported by rationing. They also show that every third-best optimum, o ther than the equal-income Walrasian equilibrium, is Pareto-dominated by some second-best optimum. In addition, standard "willingness-to- pay" cost-benefit tests are inappropriate in this environment.