Effects of Environmental and Land Use Regulation in the Oil and Gas Industry Using the Wyoming Checkerboard as a Natural Experiment: Retraction by Shelby Gerking and William E. Morgan. Published in volume 97, issue 3, pages 1032 of American Economic Review, June 2007

Testing for Indeterminacy: An Application to U.S. Monetary Policy: Comment by Andreas Beyer and Roger E. A. Farmer. Published in volume 97, issue 1, pages 524-529 of American Economic Review, March 2007

An organization makes collective decisions through neither markets nor contracts. Instead, rational agents voluntarily choose to follow a leader. In many cases, incentive problems are solved: the unique nondegenerate equilibrium achieves the first best, even though every agent has incentives to free ride. The leader has no special talents but is distinguished by getting exclusive access to information. A crucial feature is that the leader reveals part but not all of her information. It is this maintenance of informational asymmetry that permits achieving the first best.

In this short paper we take a first look at the question of whether the increasing income inequality that the US has witnessed in the past 25 years has generated increasing unhappiness in those who have been falling behind, despite their real income has risen markedly. If an individual's utility depends not only on the level of her own consumption but also on how that level compares with the consumption of others, then the observed widening of the income distribution may have implications for the happiness of different groups that go beyond those associated with the changes in their respective incomes. We find that people's happiness appears to depend positively on how well their socio-economic group is doing relative to the average in their geographic area, even after controlling for the level of their own income. In addition, we find some evidence that the relationship is much stronger for people whose group has above-average income than for people whose group has below-average income; it would thus appear that relative concerns do not become an issue until a person has attained a certain place within the income distribution.

Central banks target CPI inflation; independent central banks are concerned about their balance sheet and the level of their capital. The first fact makes it difficult for a central bank to implement the optimal escape from a liquidity trap, because it undermines a commitment to overshoot the inflation target. We show that the second fact provides a solution. Capital concerns provide a mechanism for an independent central bank to commit to inflate ex post. The optimal policy can take the form of a currency depreciation combined with a crawling peg, a policy advocated by Svensson as the “Foolproof Way” to escape from a liquidity trap.

Twenty-seven percent of the Union Army prisoners captured July 1863 or later died in captivity. At Andersonville, the death rate may have been as high as 40 percent. How did men survive such horrific conditions? Using two independent datasets, we find that friends had a statistically significant positive effect on survival probabilities and that the closer the ties between friends as measured by such identifiers as ethnicity, kinship, and the same hometown, the bigger was the impact of friends on survival probabilities.

We extend William Rogerson's (2003) intriguing analysis of simple procurement contracts to settings where the supplier's innate production cost is not necessarily distributed uniformly. Although the simple contract that Rogerson analyzes performs remarkably well when the smaller cost realizations are relatively likely, it can perform poorly when the larger cost realizations are relatively likely. We show that in all settings under consideration, a simple pair of contracts – one that involves linear cost sharing and one that involves full cost reimbursement – can always secure more than 73 percent of the gain achieved with a fully optimal contract.

Bounding Revenue Comparisons across Multi-Unit Auction Formats under ε-Best Response by James T. E. Chapman, David McAdams and Harry J. Paarsch. Published in volume 97, issue 2, pages 455-458 of American Economic Review, May 2007

Why Do Poor Children Lose Health Insurance in the SCHIP Era? The Role of Family Health by Anne Carroll, Hope Corman, Kelly Noonan and Nancy E. Reichman. Published in volume 97, issue 2, pages 398-401 of American Economic Review, May 2007