The old age provisions of the Medicaid program were designed to insure retirees against medical expenses. We estimate a structural model of savings and medical spending and use it to compute the distribution of lifetime Medicaid transfers and Medicaid valuations across currently single retirees. Compensating variation calculations indicate that current retirees value Medicaid insurance at more than its actuarial cost, but that most would value an expansion of the current Medicaid program at less than its cost. These findings suggest that for current single retirees, the Medicaid program may be of the approximately right size.

Rich people, women, and healthy people live much longer than their poor, male, and sick counterparts. Two extremes, taken from our analysis of single people in the Assets and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) dataset, illustrate this point: an unhealthy 70-year-old male at the twentieth percentile of the permanent income distribution expects to live only 6 more years, that is, to age 76. In contrast, a healthy 70-year-old woman at the eightieth percentile of the permanent income distribution expects to live 16 more years, thus making it to age 86.] Such significant differences in life expectancy could, all else equal, lead to significant differ ences in saving behavior. A related observation is that people with high permanent incomes keep large amounts of assets until very late in life. Table 1, also based on the

Immediately following a minimum wage hike, household income rises on average by about $250 per quarter and spending by roughly $700 per quarter for households with minimum wage workers. Most of the spending response is caused by a small number of households who purchase vehicles. Furthermore, we find that the high spending levels are financed through increases in collateralized debt. Our results are consistent with a model where households can borrow against durables and face costs of adjusting their durables stock.