Firms posting job openings in an online labor market were randomly assigned minimum hourly wages. When facing a minimum wage, fewer firms hired, but those they did hire paid higher wages. Hoursworked fell substantially. Treated firms shifted to hiring more productive workers. Using the platform's imposition of a market-wide minimum wage after the experiment, I find that many of the experimental results also hold in equilibrium, including the substitution towards more productive workers. However, there was also a large reduction in the number of jobs posted for which the minimum wage would likely bind.

We design and field an innovative survey of unemployment insurance (UI) recipients that yields new insights about wage stickiness on the layoff margin. A majority of UI recipients would accept pay cuts of 5–10 percent to save their jobs, and one-third would accept a 25 percent cut. Yet worker-employer discussions about cuts in pay, benefits, or hours in lieu of layoffs are exceedingly rare. Roughly one-quarter of the layoffs in our sample violate the theoretical condition for bilaterally efficient separations. We draw on our findings and other evidence to assess theories of wage stickiness and its role in layoffs.

Children spend years in foster care, and bureaucratic hurdles can unnecessarily prolong their stays. The Mi Abogado program was introduced in Chile to enhance legal aid for foster children and accelerate family reunification. In a novel approach, the Chilean government randomized the introduction of the program for children living in institutions to evaluate effects on child well-being. Using registry data, we find the program significantly reduced the duration of foster care without increasing subsequent maltreatment and placements. The exposure also decreased criminal justice involvement and improved school attendance. Results suggest that strengthening foster care services can cost-effectively improve child well-being.

For whom has earnings risk changed, and why? We answer these questions by combining the Kalman filter and EM algorithm to estimate persistent and temporary earnings for every individual at every point in time. We apply our method to administrative earnings linked with survey data. We show that since the 1980s, persistent earnings risk rose by 12.5 percent for both employed and unemployed workers and the scarring effects of unemployment doubled. At the same time, temporary earnings risk declined. Using education and occupation codes, we show that rising persistent earnings risk is concentrated among high-skill workers and related to technology adoption.