In his seminal 1943 paper on the political business cycle, Michal Kalecki (1971) argued that industrial leaders feared employment because the economic insecurity created by unemployment was necessary to keep wages low and maintain work intensity and discipline on the shop floor. On the basis of this reasoning, Kalecki concluded that governments would not use demand management policies to achieve permanent full employment. In terms of current macroeconomic debates, Kalecki had sketched the outlines of a theory of the neutral or natural rate of unemployment based on the importance of disciplinary unemployment as a regulator of unit labor costs. Kalecki's pessimism about the prospects for employment was premised in part on a view of firms in which the threat of dismissal was the central motivational device used by employers, and employees had only a tenuous connection to employers. This assumption may have been appropriate when analyzing labor markets in the United States during the 1930's. Since that time, however, the spread of unions, implicit employment contracts, and large, bureaucratically organized enterprises has resulted in a modern U.S. labor market in which many workers enjoy long job tenure and in which many firms do not appear to rely on dismissal threats as their primary motivational strategy (see David Gordon, Richard Edwards, and Michael Reich, 1982; Sanford Jacoby, 1983; and my forthcoming paper). From this perspective, it is reasonable to ask whether the presence of long-term employment relations alters the regulatory role played by unemployment. This paper examines the effect that unemployment and long-term employment relations exert on the determination of unit labor costs. The central empirical findings can be briefly summarized. First, as suggested by Kalecki, movements towards employment increase the rate of growth of wages and reduce the rate of growth of labor productivity. Second, where long-term employment relations are prevalent, the effect of unemployment on both wage and labor productivity growth is diminished.

This paper describes an organizational setting in which professional employees are required to work inefficiently long hours. The focus of our investigation is large law firms. The income sharing that characterizes legal partnerships creates incentives to promote associates who have a propensity to work very hard. Law firms use indicators of this propensity--especially an associate's record of billable hours--in promotion decisions. Reliance upon work hours as an indicator leads to a "rat-race" equilibrium in which associates work too many hours. We find evidence in support of this conclusion with data we collected from two large law firms.

This paper describes an organizational setting in which professional employees are required to work inefficiently long hours. The focus of the authors' investigation is large law firms. The income sharing that characterizes legal partnerships creates incentives to promote associates who have a propensity to work very hard. Law firms use indicators of this propensity--especially an associate's record of billable hours--in promotion decisions. Reliance upon work hours as an indicator leads to a rat-race equilibrium in which associates work too many hours. The authors find evidence in support of this conclusion with data they collected from two large law firms.

We analyze the effect of search frictions in the market for commercial health insurance. Frictions increase insurance premiums (enough to transfer 13.2 percent of consumer surplus from fully insured employer groups to insurers—approximately $34.4 billion in 1997); and increase insurance turnover (by 64 percent for the average policy). This rent transfer harms consumers and—when combined with heightened turnover—reduces incentives to invest in future health. We also find that a publicly financed insurance option can improve the efficiency of private insurance markets by reducing search friction induced distortions in pricing and marketing efforts.

Economic models of incentives in employment relationships are based on a specific theory of motivation: employees are “rational cheaters,” who anticipate the consequences of their actions and shirk when the marginal benefits exceed costs. We investigate the “rational cheater model” by observing how experimentally induced variation in monitoring of telephone call center employees influences opportunism. A significant fraction of employees behave as the “rational cheater model” predicts. A substantial proportion of employees, however, do not respond to manipulations in the monitoring rate. This heterogeneity is related to variation in employee assessments of their general treatment by the employer.