We examine the incentives that owners of competing firms give their managers. We show that, in equilibrium, each manager will be paid in excess of his decision's marginal profit in a Cournot-quantity game, but paid less than the marginal profit in a price game. In the Cournot case, deviations from profit maximization are reduced by ex ante cost uncertainty and increased by correlation in the firms' costs.

This paper examines the impact of Social Security on national saving and individual welfare in the presence of realistic capital market imperfections--market failure in the private provision of annuities and restrictions on borrowing against anticipated future wages. The introduction of Social Security increases lifetime welfare and reduces national saving if borrowing restrictions are absent. However, the increase in individual welfare is reduced, and in some cases eliminated, when borrowing constraints are taken into consideration. The substantial difference suggests the importance of reexamining the proportional payroll tax finance of Social Security.

Many important questions in macroeconomics concern the impact of taxation and spending policies on private resource allocation. One approach, typified by Robert Hall (1971) and William Brock and Stephen Turnovsky (1981), is to use dynamic general equilibrium models to address basic issues in fiscal and tax policy. The objective is to explicitly examine macroeconomic issues without embracing the market imperfections (fixed prices, missing markets, money illusion, etc.) found in conventional macroeconomic analysis. There is currently great interest in dynamic fiscal policy problems. This decade has already seen two major adjustments in tax policy, and many attempts to substantially alter spending patterns. The result of this tumult has been unprecedented peacetime deficits and much uncertainty about what measures will ultimately be used to bring the budget into balance. In this paper, I discuss the impact of alternative fiscal policies in a dynamic general equilibrium model. I examine the shortrun effects of fiscal policy changes, the efficiency cost of alternative dynamic tax policies, the effects of uncertain policy formation, and the redistributive effects of factor taxation.

A key feature of modern dynamic economies is imperfect competition. Some imperfect competition is due to institutions such as patents and copy-rights that allow Þrms to exercise market power over the sale of products they invent. Some imperfect competition is due to various forms of increas-ing returns to scale and product differentiation. Since market power is an essential feature of innovation and growth in the new economy (as it was in the old economy) we need to know how imperfect competition affects the conventional wisdom on tax policy. We argue that it has particularly striking implications for the taxation of capital. The current consensus among economists is that investment should be lightly taxed with most tax revenues coming from labor and consumption taxation; see Kenneth L. Judd (1999) for a discussion of this literature. These analyses assume perfect competition in all markets. Even though imperfect competition is common, economists generally prefer competitive models since analyses with imperfect competition usually get mired in strategic details

While taxes may be certain, U.S. tax policy has certainly not been. Furthermore, intrinsic economic risk makes investment decisions risky. Therefore, a serious examination of the effects of tax policy on dynamic economic behavior should consider both sources of uncertainty. This paper presents a simple theoretical and computational model that can analyze both intrinsic risk and uncertain taxation. Furthermore, it will be clear that these techniques will be useful for examining general problems of taxation and risk. When studying the impact of past and/or proposed tax changes, one of two extreme assumptions are usually made: either agents are perfectly aware of future tax policy, a perfect foresight assumption, or they always believe that no change will ever occur, a myopic foresight assumption. These two assumptions yield substantially different views of recent tax experience, as Alan Auerbach and James Hines (1987) demonstrate in a partial-equilibrium context. Both are clearly wrong. The myopic specification assumes that individuals believe at each point in time that the current tax law will surely continue forever, even after they have been hit repeatedly with tax changes. On the other hand, it is absurd to think that in, say, 1977, a significant number of individuals perfectly knew the various tax changes that would occur during the following decade. This paper analyzes a dynamic general equilibrium model wherein taxpayers understand the uncertainty in tax policy when making their deci-

This paper examines the impact of social security on national saving and individual welfare in the presence of realistic capital-market imperfections: market failure in the private provision of annuities and restrictions on borrowing against anticipated future wages. The introduction of social security increases lifetime welfare and reduces national saving if borrowing restrictions are absent. However, the increase in individual welfare is reduced, and in some cases eliminated, when borrowing constraints are taken into consideration. The substantial difference suggests the importance of reexamining the proportional payroll tax finance of social security.