Many economists have expressed concern that approaches borrowed from the humanities or from the softer social sciences will detract from the rigor and objectivity of economic science and give voice to those without proper training-and in so doing reduce the discipline to a science no more defensible than alchemy. Since much feminist thought in economics draws heavily from intellectual traditions alien to mainstream economists (e.g. critical interpretive theory, cultural studies, and feminist theory), some economists may wonder what such modes of inquiry have to offer economics.' Further, they may ask, are there no pitfalls in modes of inquiry not disciplined by accepted economic methodologies? In short, what do those Visigoths know? My purpose is to address issues in method and theory underlying recent feminist work in economics, and to explain how economics may gain by opening its disciplinary gates. From the perspective of traditional mainstream practice in economics, two prominent issues emerge in considering modes of inquiry and theory drawn from other disciplines. The first has to do with what counts as theory and the role of critique in theorizing. The second has to do with the need to sort out better theories from worse and the perceived dangers of rampant relativism. I will address these in turn.

We model entry incentives in auctions with risk-neutral bidders and characterize a symmetric equilibrium in which the number of entrants is stochastic. The presence of too many potential bidders raises coordination costs that detract from welfare. We show that the seller and society can benefit from policies that reduce market thickness (i.e., the relative abundance of buyers). Our analysis extends well-known revenue-equivalence and ranking theorems but also demonstrates that variations in the auction environment affect optimal policies (e.g., reservation prices) in ways not anticipated by models that ignore entry.

This study finds that in probit equations 50% of people working 35 hours per week in the US will not be offered benefits or health insurance through their employers to replace services received while on welfare. Women with an average of 39 hours of work per week have an average 76% probability of being offered medical benefits (as one of three example options) while men working an average of 43 hours per week have on average a 72% probability of being offered medical benefits. The probability of being offered medical insurance life insurance and retirement benefits is slightly over 20% for working 35 hours per week. Although women have a slightly higher probability of being offered all the benefits individuals with children have a lower probability of being offered all the benefits which is not significant for medical insurance retirement or flexible work schedules. Individuals working for large firms have a greater probability of being offered benefits excluding flexible scheduling and profit sharing. Working longer hours increases the probability of receiving benefits except in training situations. Higher wages are found in the three stage least squares estimation in reduced form equation to be related to more work experience higher aptitude test scores residence in a standard metropolitan statistical area work at larger firms more work hours per week and not being single. Data are obtained from the 1991 US National Longitudinal Survey of Labor Market Experience of Youth among 1988 persons 26-34 years old who worked and were paid an hourly wage. Persons in the sample earned an average of $9.00 per hour and worked slightly more than 41 hours per week. 33% were Black 20% Hispanic and slightly under 50% were female. About 60% had a child under 6 years old. The average firm size was 5205 employees.

We investigate industry response to cyclical variations in demand. Production units that embody the newest process and product innovations are continuously being created, and outdated units are being destroyed. Although outdated units are the most likely to turn unprofitable and be scrapped in a recession, they can be "insulated" from the fall in demand by a reduction in creation. The structure of adjustment costs plays a determinant role in the responsiveness of those two margins. The calibrated model matches the relative volatilities of the observed manufacturing job creation and destruction series, and their asymmetries over the cycle.