Languages differ widely in the ways they encode time. I test the hypothesis that the languages that grammatically associate the future and the present, foster future-oriented behavior. This prediction arises naturally when well-documented effects of language structure are merged with models of intertemporal choice. Empirically, I find that speakers of such languages: save more, retire with more wealth, smoke less, practice safer sex, and are less obese. This holds both across countries and within countries when comparing demographically similar native households. The evidence does not support the most obvious forms of common causation. I discuss implications for theories of intertemporal choice.

We reanalyze Long and Ferrie's data. We find that the association of occupational status across generations was quite similar over time and place. Two significant differences were: (i) American farms in 1880 were far more open to men who had nonfarm backgrounds than were American farms in 1973 or British farms in either century; (ii) of the four cases, the intergenerational correlation was strongest in Britain in 1881. Structural mobility related to, among other things, economic growth and occupational differentiation, affected mobility most in 1970s America.

We compare nonparametric instrumental variables (IV) models with linear models and 2SLS methods when dependent variables are discrete. A 2SLS method can deliver a consistent estimator of a Local Average Treatment Effect but is not informative about other treatment effect parameters. The IV models set identify a range of interesting structural and treatment effect parameters. We give set identification results for a counterfactual probability and an Average Treatment Effect in a IV binary threshold crossing model. We illustrate using data on female employment and family size (employed by Joshua Angrist and William Evans (1998)) and compare with their LATE estimates.

We define national security (NS) as public policies that protect the safety or welfare of a nation's citizens from substantial threats. NS capital provides societal insurance against widespread harm or catastrophe, so optimal NS investments may have very low expected rates of return. Investment targeted at extreme events (war) has spillovers, reducing potential harm in less threatening situations as well. Potential threats are highly uncertain, which raises the value of ex-post scalability of NS technologies. Higher probabilities of extreme events raise the demand for flexibility, so ex-post responses to threats are more elastic, but may reduce current precaution.

One in five Zambian children lives with an HIV/AIDS-infected adult. We estimate the effect that the availability of adult antiretroviral therapy (ART) has on the health of such children. Using a triple difference specification, we find that adult access to ART resulted in increased weight-for-age and decreased incidence of stunting among children younger than 60 months who resided with an infected father or other infected adult in an intact household. Because the increased availability of adult ART in sub-Saharan Africa has multigenerational effects, cost-effectiveness estimates restricted to direct recipients understate the economic benefit of the treatment.

The Federal Reserve's mandate has evolved considerably over the organization's hundred-year history. It was changed from an initial focus in 1913 on financial stability, to fiscal financing in World War II and its aftermath, to a strong anti-inflation focus from the late 1970s, and then back to greater emphasis on financial stability since the Great Contraction. Yet, as the Fed's mandate has expanded in recent years, its range of instruments has narrowed, partly based on a misguided belief in the inherent stability of financial markets. We argue for a return to multiple instruments, including a more active role for reserve requirements.

In 1990, the US had the sixth highest female labor participation rate among 22 OECD countries. By 2010 its rank had fallen to seventeenth. We find that the expansion of “family-friendly” policies, including parental leave and part-time work entitlements in other OECD countries, explains 29 percent of the decrease in US women's labor force participation relative to these other countries. However, these policies also appear to encourage part-time work and employment in lower level positions: US women are more likely than women in other countries to have full time jobs and to work as managers or professionals.

This paper asks whether the slow recovery of the US economy from the trough of the Great Recession was anticipated, and identifies some of the factors that contributed to surprises in the course of the recovery. We construct a narrative using news reports and government announcements to identify policy and financial shocks. We then compare forecasts and forecast revisions of GDP to the narrative. Successive financial and fiscal shocks emanating from Europe, together with self-inflicted wounds from the political stalemate over the US fiscal situation, help explain the slowing of the pace of an already slow recovery.

Traditional financing sources such as private and public equity may not be ideal for investment projects with low probabilities of success, long time horizons, and large capital requirements. Nevertheless, such projects, if not too highly correlated, may yield attractive risk-adjusted returns when combined into a single portfolio. Such “megafund” portfolios may be too large to finance through private or public equity alone. But with sufficient diversification and risk analytics, debt financing via securitization may be feasible. Credit enhancements (i.e., derivatives and government guarantees) can also improve megafund economics. We present an analytical framework and illustrative empirical examples involving cancer research.

We present evidence on the level of and trend in inequality from 1985-2010 in the United States, using disposable income and consumption for a sample of individuals from the Consumer Expenditure (CE) Survey. Differing from the findings in other recent research, we find that the trends in income and consumption inequality are broadly similar between 1985 and 2006, but diverge during the Great Recession with consumption inequality decreasing and income inequality increasing. Given the differences in the trends in inequality in the last four years, using both income and consumption provides useful information.