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Experimental Cost of Information

American Economic Review 2022 112(9), 3106-3123
We relate two main representations of the cost of acquiring information: a cost that depends on the experiment performed, as in statistical decision theory, and a cost that depends on the distribution of posterior beliefs, as in applications of rational inattention. We show that in many cases of interest, posterior-based costs are inconsistent with a primitive model of costly experimentation. The inconsistency is at the core of known limits to the application of rational inattention in games and, more broadly, in equilibrium analyses where beliefs are endogenous; we show that an experiment-based approach helps to understand and overcome these difficulties.

Self-Confirming Equilibrium and Model Uncertainty

American Economic Review 2015 105(2), 646-677
We analyze a notion of self-confirming equilibrium with non-neutral ambiguity attitudes that generalizes the traditional concept. We show that the set of equilibria expands as ambiguity aversion increases. The intuition is quite simple: by playing the same strategy in a stationary environment, an agent learns the implied distribution of payoffs, but alternative strategies yield payoffs with unknown distributions; increased aversion to ambiguity makes such strategies less appealing. In sum, a kind of “status quo bias” emerges; in the long run, the uncertainty related to tested strategies disappears, but the uncertainty implied by the untested ones does not.

Risk Aversion and Insurance Propensity

American Economic Review 2025 115(5), 1597-1649
We provide a new foundation of risk aversion by showing that this attitude is fully captured by the propensity to seize insurance opportunities. In our main results, we first characterize Arrow-Pratt (1963–1964) risk aversion in terms of propensity to full insurance and the stronger notion of risk aversion of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970) in terms of propensity to partial insurance. We then extend the analysis to comparative risk aversion by showing that the classical notion of Yaari (1969) corresponds to comparative propensity to full insurance, while the stronger notion of Ross (1981) corresponds to comparative propensity to partial insurance.