According to a common argument, the presence of strong intellectual property rights spurs innovation, which then leads to fiercer competition, higher economic growth and increasing benefits for the average consumers. We argue that, in the case of intellectual property rights, this has lead to misconceptions and abuses. Current legislation on intellectual property confuses the protection of property rights on objects in which ideas are embodied with the attribution of monopoly power on the idea itself and, furthermore, with restrictions on the usage of such goods on the part of the buyers. This implies that both patent and copyright laws should be dramatically altered. To back up our claim we provide theoretical arguments, even for the most extreme case in which goods are produced at a positive fixed cost and zero marginal cost.

Empirical research has reached the puzzling conclusion that stronger patents do little or nothing to encourage innovation. We show that the facts that have led to the assumption of fixed cost in the discovery process can be equally well explained by a standard model of diminishing returns. This may explain much of the misunderstanding of the (supposedly positive) role of monopoly in innovation and growth, thereby accounting for the empirical puzzle.

Two modifications are introduced into the standard real-business-cycle model: habit preferences and a two-sector technology with limited intersectoral factor mobility. The model is consistent with the observed mean risk-free rate, equity premium, and Sharpe ratio on equity. In addition, its business-cycle implications represent a substantial improvement over the standard model. It accounts for persistence in output, comovement of employment across different sectors over the business cycle, the evidence of “excess sensitivity” of consumption growth to output growth, and the “inverted leading-indicator property of interest rates,” that interest rates are negatively correlated with future output.