We argue that long-term debt has a role in controlling management's ability to finance future investments. Companies with high (widely held) debt will find it hard to raise capital, since new security-holders will have low priority relative to existing creditors; conversely for companies with low debt. We show that there is an optimal debt--equity ratio and mix of senior and junior debt if management undertakes unprofitable as well as profitable investments. We derive conditions under which equity and a single class of senior long-term debt work as well as more complex contracts for controlling investment behavior.

The authors present a structural model of the U.S. economy that combines their price-contracting specification with a term-structure relationship, an aggregate demand curve, and a monetary-policy reaction function. The model matches important features of postwar data well and provides a structural explanation of the correlation between real output and the short-term nominal rate of interest. The authors perform a battery of monetary-policy experiments that show that, as viewed through the lens of this model, monetary policy has struck a good balance recently among competing monetary-policy objectives.

We present a structural model of the U.S. economy that combines our price-contracting specification with a term-structure relationship, an aggregate demand curve, and a monetary-policy reaction function. The model matches important features of postwar data well and provides a structural explanation of the correlation between real output and the short-term nominal rate of interest. We perform a battery of monetary-policy experiments which show that, as viewed through the lens of this model, monetary policy has struck a good balance recently among competing monetary-policy objectives.