This paper considers the economic sanctions that were applied in the mid-1980s to pressure the South African government to end apartheid. It asks what role those sanctions played in the eventual demise of the apartheid regime and concludes that the role was probably very small. An alternative explanation for the regime change is offered: the communist bloc combined to bring about the change. If one is to argue for the efficacy of sanctions, two key obstacles are their limited economic impact and the substantial lag between the imposition of sanctions and the political change. Since sanctions preceded the change of government, it is impossible to rule them out as a determinant. However, their principal effect was probably psychological. The implication is that the South African case should not serve as the lone major instance of effective sanctions. Keywords: Sanctions, South Africa, Political Economy, Trade J.E.L. classification: F14 2 Sanctions on South Africa: What did th...

This paper demonstrates that bilateral free-trade agreements can undermine political support for further multilateral trade liberalization. If a bilateral trade agreement offers disproportionately large gains to key agents in a country, then their reservation utility is raised above the multilateral free-trade level, and a multilateral agreement would be blocked. Bilateral agreements between countries with similar factor endowments are most likely to have this effect. It also follows that bilateral free-trade agreements can never increase political support for multilateral free trade.