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Does Increasing Women's Schooling Raise the Schooling of the Next Generation? Reply

American Economic Review 2005 95(5), 1745-1751
We reassess the empirical robustness of the empirical findings in Jere R. Berhman and Mark R. Rosenzweig (2002) using new information on schooling which was collected and coded independently of codings carried out by both Kate Antonovics and Arthur Goldberger, and Berhmamn and Rosenzweig. We conclude that the independently coded data and the codings by Antonovics and Goldberger provide additional support for Behrman and Rosenzweig's original results showing that the positive cross-sectional relationship between a mother's schooling and her child's schooling is not robust to controls for unmeasured, intergenerationally correlated endowments, while the positive effect of paternal schooling is robust.

Mortality Reductions, Educational Attainment, and Fertility Choice

American Economic Review 2005 95(3), 580-601
This paper develops a model where reductions in mortality are the main force behind economic development. The model generates a pattern of changes similar to the demographic transition, where gains in life expectancy at birth are followed by reductions in fertility and increases in the rate of human capital accumulation. The onset of the transition is characterized by a critical level of life expectancy at birth, which marks the movement of the economy from a Malthusian equilibrium to an equilibrium with investments in human capital and the possibility of long-run growth.

Foreign Direct Investment and the Domestic Capital Stock

American Economic Review 2005 95(2), 33-38
Rising levels of foreign direct investment (FDI) concern growing numbers of policymakers and members of the American public. These concerns stem from the perception that foreign activities of American multinational corporations reduce employment and other economic activities within the United States. While investment flows within the United States go largely unnoticed, in an international setting the lexicon of “winners” and “losers” can be inescapable. Curiously, both capital-exporting countries and capital-importing countries have at times expressed concern over the consequences of international capital flows. Capital-exporting countries worry that too much of their capital goes abroad, while capital-importing countries fear foreign control of domestic assets and the possible macroeconomic instability associated with rapid changes in foreign investment levels. The concerns of capital-exporting countries, while diffuse, often are based on conceptions of outbound FDI as diverting economic activity. Unsurprisingly, growing overseas activities of multinational firms have become a source of economic insecurity for workers, managers, and tax collectors (see e.g., Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter, 2001).

The Quantity and Quality of Life and the Evolution of World Inequality

American Economic Review 2005 95(1), 277-291
GDP per capita is usually used to proxy for the quality of life of individuals living in different countries. Welfare is also affected by quantity of life, however, as represented by longevity. This paper incorporates longevity into an overall assessment of the evolution of cross-country inequality and shows that it is quantitatively important. The absence of reduction in cross-country inequality up to the 1990s documented in previous work is in stark contrast to the reduction in inequality after incorporating gains in longevity. Throughout the post–World War II period, health contributed to reduce significantly welfare inequality across countries. This paper derives valuation formulas for infra-marginal changes in longevity and computes a "full" growth rate that incorporates the gains in health experienced by 96 countries for the period between 1960 and 2000. Incorporating longevity gains changes traditional results; countries starting with lower income tended to grow faster than countries starting with higher income. We estimate an average yearly growth in "full income" of 4.1 percent for the poorest 50 percent of countries in 1960, of which 1.7 percentage points are due to health, as opposed to a growth of 2.6 percent for the richest 50 percent of countries, of which only 0.4 percentage points are due to health. Additionally, we decompose changes in life expectancy into changes attributable to 13 broad groups of causes of death and three age groups. We show that mortality from infectious, respiratory, and digestive diseases, congenital, perinatal, and “ill-defined” conditions, mostly concentrated before age 20 and between ages 20 and 50, is responsible for most of the reduction in life expectancy inequality. At the same time, the recent effect of AIDS, together with reductions in mortality after age 50--due to nervous system, senses organs, heart and circulatory diseases--contributed to increase health inequality across countries.

The Willingness to Pay–Willingness to Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” Subject Misconceptions, and Experimental Procedures for Eliciting Valuations

American Economic Review 2005 95(3), 530-545 open access
We conduct experiments to explore the possibility that subject misconceptions, as opposed to a particular theory of preferences referred to as the “endowment effect,” account for reported gaps between willingness to pay (“WTP”) and willingness to accept (“WTA”). The literature reveals two important facts. First, there is no consensus regarding the nature or robustness of WTP-WTA gaps. Second, while experimenters are careful to control for subject misconceptions, there is no consensus about the fundamental properties of misconceptions or how to avoid them. Instead, by implementing different types of experimental controls, experimenters have revealed notions of how misconceptions arise. Experimenters have applied these controls separately or in different combinations. Such controls include ensuring subject anonymity, using incentive-compatible elicitation mechanisms, and providing subjects with practice and training on the elicitation mechanism before employing it to measure valuations. The pattern of results reported in the literature suggests that the widely differing reports of WTP-WTA gaps could be due to an incomplete science regarding subject misconceptions. We implement a “revealed theory” methodology to compensate for the lack of a theory of misconceptions. Theories implicit in experimental procedures found in the literature are at the heart of our experimental design. Thus, our approach to addressing subject misconceptions reflects an attempt to control simultaneously for all dimensions of concern over possible subject misconceptions found in the literature. To this end, our procedures modify the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism used in previous studies to elicit values. In addition, our procedures supplement commonly used procedures by providing extensive training on the elicitation mechanism before subjects provide WTP and WTA responses. Experiments were conducted using both lotteries and mugs, goods frequently used in endowment effect experiments. Using the modified procedures, we observe no gap between WTA and WTP. Therefore, our results call into question the interpretation of observed gaps as evidence of loss aversion or prospect theory. Further evidence is required before convincing interpretations of observed gaps can be advanced.

Matching with Contracts

American Economic Review 2005 95(4), 913-935
We develop a model of matching with contracts which incorporates, as special cases, the college admissions problem, the Kelso-Crawford labor market matching model, and ascending package auctions. We introduce a new “law of aggregate demand” for the case of discrete heterogeneous workers and show that, when workers are substitutes, this law is satisfied by profit-maximizing firms. When workers are substitutes and the law is satisfied, truthful reporting is a dominant strategy for workers in a worker-offering auction/matching algorithm. We also parameterize a large class of preferences satisfying the two conditions.

Annuities and Individual Welfare

American Economic Review 2005 95(5), 1573-1590
Advancing annuity demand theory, we present sufficient conditions for the optimality of full annuitization under market completeness which are substantially less restrictive than those used by Menahem E. Yaari (1965). We examine demand with market incompleteness, finding that positive annuitization remains optimal widely, but complete annuitization does not. How uninsured medical expenses affect demand for illiquid annuities depends critically on the timing of the risk. A new set of calculations with optimal consumption trajectories very different from available annuity income streams still shows a preference for considerable annuitization, suggesting that limited annuity purchases are plausibly due to psychological or behavioral biases.

Sudden Stops and Output Drops

American Economic Review 2005 95(2), 381-387
In recent financial crises and in recent theoretical studies of them, abrupt declines in capital inflows, or sudden stops, have been linked with large drops in output. Do sudden stops cause output drops? No, according to a standard equilibrium model in which sudden stops are generated by an abrupt tightening of a country?s collateral constraint on foreign borrowing. In this model, in fact, sudden stops lead to output increases, not decreases. An examination of the quantitative effects of a well-known sudden stop, in Mexico in the mid-1990s, confirms that a drop in output accompanying a sudden stop cannot be accounted for by the sudden stop alone. To generate an output drop during a financial crisis, as other studies have done, the model must include other economic frictions which have negative effects on output large enough to overwhelm the positive effect of the sudden stop.