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The Return to Capital in Ghana

American Economic Review 2006 96(2), 388-393 open access
Countries? ” If there exist aggregate production functions representing approximately the same technology across countries, then the vastly higher output per worker in richer countries implies that capital per worker must be much higher in these countries, and diminishing returns implies a much lower rate of return to capital in rich than in poor countries. The details of the calculation depend, of course, on specific assumptions. However, the magnitudes are sufficiently large that the absence of massive capital flows to the poorest countries is properly seen as a fundamental puzzle. Lucas considers the possibility that capital market imperfections permit the existence of a gap in the returns to capital across countries, but argues that this cannot account for most of the difference implied by his calculation. He, therefore, raises the possibility that there are huge differences in human capital across countries, and externalities associated with these differences imply that returns to physical capital are not so different across countries with even large differences in physical capital per worker. Accordingly, there is no mystery about the lack of physical capital flows. In contrast, Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther C. Duflo (2005) review a good deal of evidence, mostly from India, showing widely varying and often very high real interest rates. In addition, ∗We are grateful to Marcus Noland for the initial conversation that led to this paper, to Erica Field, Barbara O’Brien and Yuichi Kitamura for valuable comments, and to Hyungi Woo, Tavneet Suri, and Patrick Amihere

The Impact of Shrouded Fees: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in the Indian Mutual Funds Market

American Economic Review 2012 102(1), 576-593
We study a natural experiment in the Indian mutual funds sector that created a 22-month period in which closed-end funds were allowed to charge an arguably shrouded fee, whereas open-end funds were forced to charge entry loads. Forty-five new closed-end funds were started during this period, collecting $7.6 billion US, whereas only two closed-end funds were started in the 66 months prior to this period, collecting $42 billion US, and no closed-end funds were started in the 20 months after this period. We estimate that investors lost and fund firms gained approximately $350 million US due to this shrouding. JEL: D14, G23, G28, O16