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What Is Discrimination? Gender in the American Economic Association, 1935–2004

American Economic Review 2006 96(4), 1283-1292
We illustrate problems of measuring discrimination using elections to AEA offices. With a new econometric technique, we find female candidates have a much better than random chance of victory. This advantage is either reverse discrimination or reflects beliefs that women are more productive. The former interpretation could be explained by an unchanging median voter whose preferences were not satisfied by suppliers of candidates; but there was a structural change in voting behavior in the mid-1970s. The results suggest it is generally impossible to claim differences in rewards, for different groups measure the extent of discrimination or even its direction.

Union Organizing Activity, Firm Growth, and the Business Cycle

American Economic Review 1993 83(1), 203-220
This paper analyzes the relationship between changes in unionization and firm growth. Average growth is significantly lower in manufacturing firms that experience successful union elections, but these strong "effects" are largely illusory. We find no evidence of a significant relationship between unionization and firm growth, despite a strong cyclical pattern in election activity. Our results suggest that the significant negative effect of organizing activity on a firm's market value is not accompanied by any growth changes. We therefore cannot reject the hypothesis that the equity losses from union election activity represent a simple transfer of wealth from shareholders to workers.

Union organizing activity, firm growth and the business cycle

American Economic Review 1993
This paper analyzes the relationship between changes in unionization and firm growth. Average growth is significantly low er in manufacturing firms that experience successful union elections bu t these strong "effects" are largely illusory. The authors find no evidence of a significant relationship between unionization and firm growth, despite a strong cyclical pattern in election activity. Thei r results suggest that the significant negative effect of organizing activity on a firm's market value is not accompanied by any growth changes. The authors, therefore, cannot reject the hypothesis that t he equity losses from union election activity represent a simple transf er of wealth from shareholders to workers.